IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
(Dyett v. Turner, 439 P2d 266 @ 269, 20 U2d 403 [1968])
THE NON-RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Chief Justice A.H. Ellett

The method of amending the U.S. Constitution is provided for in Article V of the original document. No other method will accomplish this purpose. That Article provides as follows:
“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress;”
The Civil war had to be fought to determine whether the Union was indissoluble and whether any State could secede or withdraw there from. The issue was settled first on the field of battle by force of arms, and second by the pronouncement of the highest court of the land. In the case of State of Texas v. White,1 it was claimed that Texas having seceded from the Union and severed her relationship with a majority of the States of the Union, and having by her Ordinance of Secession attempted to throw off her allegiance to the Constitution of the United States, had thus disabled herself from prosecuting a suit in the Federal Courts. In speaking on this point the Court at page 726, 19 L. Ed. 227 held:
When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. All the obligations of perpetual union, and all the guarantees of republican government in the Union, attached at once to the State. The act which consummated her admission into the Union was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a new member into the political body. And it was final. The union between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as the union between the original States. There was no place for reconsideration, or revocation, except through revolution, or
through consent of the States. Considered therefore as transactions under the Constitution, the ordinance of secession, adopted by the
convention and ratified by a majority of the citizens of Texas, and all the acts of her legislature intended to give effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null. They were utterly without operation in law. The obligations of the State, as a member of the Union, and of every citizen of the State, as a citizen of the United
States, remained perfect and unimpaired. It certainly follows that the State did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union. If this were otherwise, the State must have become foreign, and her citizens foreigners. The war must have ceased to be a war for the suppression of rebellion, and must have
become a war for conquest of subjugation.
Our conclusion therefore is, that Texas continued to be a State, and a State of the Union, notwithstanding the transactions to which we have referred. And this conclusion, in our judgment, is not in conflict with any act or declaration of any department of the National government, but entirely in accordance with the whole series of such acts and declarations since the first out break of the rebellion.
It is necessary to review the historical background to understand how the Fourteenth Amendment came to be a part of our U.S. Constitution.
General Lee had surrendered his Army on April 9, 1865, and General Johnston surrendered his 17 days later. Within a period of less than six weeks thereafter, not one Confederate soldier was bearing arms. By June 30, 1865, the Confederate States were all restored by Presidential Proclamation to their proper positions as States in an indissoluble Union2, and practically all Citizens thereof3.
A few Citizens were excepted from the Amnesty Proclamation, such, for example, as Civil or Diplomatic Officers of the late Confederate government and all of the seceding States; United States Judges, members of Congress and commissioned Officers of the United States Army and Navy who left their posts to aid the rebellion: Officers in the Confederate military forces above the rank of Colonel in the Army and Lieutenant in the Navy; all who resigned commissions in the Army or Navy of the United States to assist the rebellion; and all Officers of the military forces of the Confederacy who had been educated at the military or naval academy of the United States, etc., etc., had been granted amnesty. Immediately thereafter, each of the seceding States functioned as regular States in the Union with both State and Federal Courts in full operation.
President Lincoln had declared the freedom of the slaves as a war measure, but when the war ended, the effect of the Proclamation was ended, and so it was necessary to propose and to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment in order to insure the freedom of the slaves.
The 11 southern States, having taken their rightful and necessary place in the indestructible Union, proceeded to determine whether to ratify or reject the proposed Thirteenth Amendment.
In order for the Thirteenth Amendment to become a part of the Constitution, it was necessary that the proposed Amendment be ratified by 27 of the 36 States. Among those 27 States ratifying the Thirteenth Amendment were 10 from the South, to wit, Louisiana, Tennessee, Arkansas, South Carolina, Alabama, North Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Florida, and Texas.
When the 39th Congress assembled on December 5, 1865, the Senators and Representatives from the 25 northern States voted to deny seats in both Houses of Congress to anyone elected from the 11 southern States. The full complement of Senators from the 36 States of the Union was 72, and the full membership in the House was 240. Since it requires only a majority vote4 to refuse a seat in Congress, only the 50 Senators and 182 Congressmen from the North were seated. All of the 22 Senators and 58 Representatives from the southern States were denied seats.
Joint Resolution No. 48, proposing the Fourteenth Amendment, was a matter of great concern to the Congress and to the people of the Nation. In order to have this proposed Amendment submitted to the 36 States for ratification, it was necessary that two thirds of each House concur.
A count of noses showed that only 33 Senators were favorable to the measure, and 33 was a far cry from two thirds of 72 and lacked one of being two thirds of the 50 seated Senators.

While it requires only a majority of votes to refuse a seat to a Senator, it requires a two thirds majority to unseat a member once he is seated5.
One John P. Stockton was seated on December 5, 1865, as one of the Senators from New Jersey. He was outspoken in his opposition to Joint Resolution No. 48 proposing the Fourteenth
Amendment. The leadership in the Senate, not having control of two thirds of the seated Senators, voted to refuse to seat Mr. Stockton upon the ground that he had received only a
plurality and not a majority of the votes of the New Jersey legislature. It was the law of New Jersey, and several other States, that a plurality vote was sufficient for election. Besides, the
Senator had already been seated. Nevertheless, his seat was -refused- and the 33 favorable votes thus became the required two thirds of the 49 members of the Senate.
In the House of Representatives, it would require 122 votes to be two thirds of the 182 members seated. Only 120 voted for the proposed Amendment, but because there were 30
abstentions, it was declared to have been passed by a two thirds vote of the House.
Whether it requires two thirds of the full membership of both Houses to propose an Amendment to the Constitution or only two thirds of those seated or two thirds of those voting
is a question which it would seem could only be determined by the United States Supreme Court.
However, it is perhaps not so important for the reason that the Amendment is only  proposed by Congress.  It must be -ratified- by three fourths of the States in the Union before it becomes a part of the Constitution. The method of securing the passage through Congress is set out above, as it throws some light on the means used to obtain ratification by the States thereafter.
Nebraska had been admitted to the Union and so the Secretary of State, in transmitting the proposed Amendment, announced that ratification by 28 States would be needed before the
Amendment would become part of the Constitution since there were at the time 37 States in the Union. A rejection by 10 States would thus defeat the proposal.
By March 17, 1867; the proposed Amendment had been ratified by 17 States and rejected by 10 with California voting to take no action thereon which was equivalent to rejection, thus the proposal was defeated.
One of the ratifying States, Oregon; had ratified by a membership wherein two legislators were subsequently held not to be duly elected, and after the contest, the duly elected members
of the legislature of Oregon rejected the proposed Amendment. However, this rejection came after the Amendment was declared passed.
Despite the fact that the southern States had been functioning peacefully for two years and had been counted to secure ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress passed the
Reconstruction Act [March 2, 1867], which provided for the military occupation of 10 of the 11 southern States. It excluded Tennessee from military occupation and one must suspect it was because Tennessee had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment on July 7, 1866.
The “Act” further disenfranchised practically all white voters and provided that no Senator or Congressman from the occupied States could be seated in Congress until a new Constitution was adopted by each State which would be approved by Congress. The “Act” further provided that each of the 10 States was required to ratify the proposed Fourteenth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment must become a part of the Constitution of the United States before the military occupancy would cease and the States be allowed to have seats in Congress.
By the time the Reconstruction Act had been declared to be the law; three more States had ratified the proposed Fourteenth Amendment and two States, Louisiana and Delaware, had
rejected it. Maryland then withdrew its prior ratification and rejected the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. Ohio followed suit and withdrew its prior ratification, as also did New Jersey and California, (which earlier had voted not to pass upon the proposal), now voted to reject the Amendment. Thus 16 of the 37 States had rejected the proposed Amendment.
By spurious, non-representative governments; seven of the southern States, (which had heretofore rejected the proposed Amendment under the duress of military occupation and of
being denied representation in Congress), did attempt to ratify the proposed Fourteenth Amendment. The Secretary of State, (of July 20, 1868), issued his Proclamation wherein he stated that it was his duty under the law to cause Amendments to be published and certified as a part of the Constitution when he received official notice that they had been adopted pursuant to the Constitution. Thereafter his certificate contained the following language:
And whereas neither the Act just quoted from, nor any other law, expressly or by conclusive implication.,
authorizes the Secretary of State to determine and decide doubtful questions as to the authenticity of the
organization of State legislatures, or as to the power of any State legislature to recall a previous act or
resolution of ratification of any amendment proposed to the Constitution;
And whereas it appears from official documents on file in this Department that the amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, proposed as aforesaid, has been ratified by the legislatures of the States
of [naming 23, including New Jersey, Ohio, and Oregon];
And whereas it further appears from documents on file in this Department that the amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, proposed as aforesaid, has also been ratified by newly constituted and
newly established bodies avowing themselves to be and acting as the legislatures, respectively, of the States
of Arkansas, Florida, North Carolina, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Alabama;
And whereas it further appears from official documents on file in this Department that the legislatures of two
of the States first above enumerated, to wit, Ohio and New Jersey, have since passed resolutions respectively
withdrawing the consent of each of said States to the aforesaid amendment; and whereas it is deemed a
matter of doubt and uncertainty whether such resolutions are not irregular, invalid, and therefore ineffectual
for withdrawing the consent of the said two States, or of either of them, to the aforesaid amendment;
And whereas the whole number of States in the United States is thirty-seven, to wit: [naming them];
And whereas the twenty-three States first hereinbefore named, whose legislatures have ratified the said
proposed amendment, and the six States next there after named, as having ratified the said proposed
amendment by newly constituted and established legislative bodies, together constitute three fourths of the
whole number of States in the United States;
Now, therefore, be it known that I, WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State of the United States, by virtue and
in pursuant of the second section of the act of Congress, approved the twentieth of April, eighteen hundred
and eighteen, hereinbefore cited, do hereby certify that if the resolutions of the legislatures of Ohio and New
Jersey ratifying the aforesaid amendment are to be deemed as remaining of full force and effect,
notwithstanding the subsequent resolutions of the legislatures of those States, which purport to withdraw the
consent of said States from such ratification, then the aforesaid amendment had been ratified in the manner
hereinbefore mentioned, and so has become valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution
of the United States.” * * *6
Congress was not satisfied with the Proclamation as issued and on the next day passed a Concurrent Resolution wherein it was resolved:
That said Fourteenth Article is hereby declared to be a part of the Constitution of the United States, and it
shall be duly promulgated as such by the Secretary of State. – Resolution set forth in Proclamation of Secretary
of State, (15 Stat. 709 [1868]). – See also U.S.C.A., Amends. 1 to 5, Constitution, p. 11.

Thereupon; William H. Seward, the Secretary of State (after setting forth the Concurrent Resolution of both Houses of Congress) then certified that the Amendment:
Has become valid to all intents and purposes as a part of the Constitution of the United States. 7
The Constitution of the United States is silent as to who should decide whether a proposed
Amendment has or has not been passed according to formal provisions of Article V of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court of the United States is the ultimate authority on the meaning
of the Constitution and has never hesitated in a proper case to declare an “Act” of Congress
“unconstitutional” – except when the “Act”’ purported to amend the Constitution.
In the case of Leser v. Garnett, the question was before 8 the Supreme Court as to whether or
not the Nineteenth Amendment had been ratified pursuant to the Constitution. In the last
paragraph of the decision the Supreme Court said:
As the legislatures of Tennessee and of West Virginia had power to adopt the resolutions of ratification,
official notice to the Secretary, duly authenticated, that they had done so, was conclusive upon him, and,
being certified to by his proclamation, is conclusive upon the courts.
The duty of the Secretary of State was ministerial, to wit, to count and determine when three
fourths of the States had ratified the proposed Amendment. He could not determine that a State,
once having rejected a proposed Amendment, could thereafter approve it; nor could he determine
that a State, once having ratified that proposal, could thereafter reject it. The Supreme Court,
and not Congress, should determine whether the Amendment process be final or would not be
final, whether the first vote was for ratification or rejection.
In order to have 27 States ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, it was necessary to count those
States which had first rejected and then under the duress of military occupation had ratified, and
then also to count those States which initially ratified but subsequently rejected the proposal.
To leave such dishonest counting to a fractional part of Congress is dangerous in the extreme.
What is to prevent any political party having control of both Houses of Congress from refusing
to seat the opposition and then passing a Joint Resolution to the effect that the Constitution is
amended and that it is the duty of the Administrator of the General Services Administration [now
the Archivist of the United States] to proclaim the adoption? Would the Supreme Court of the
United States still say the problem was political and refuse to determine whether constitutional
standards had been met? [Yes - Epperly et. al. v. United States /9].
How can it be conceived in the minds of anyone that a combination of powerful States can
by force of arms deny another State a right to have representation in Congress until it has ratified
an Amendment which its people oppose? [And by what authority does any State (or combination
thereof) claim to declare a sister State to have an invalid government?] The Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted by means almost as bad as that suggested above.
For a more detailed account of how the Fourteenth Amendment was forced upon the Nation, see Articles in
11 S.C.L.Q. 484 and 28 Tul.L.Rev. 22.

The Reconstruction Acts
Introduction
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution for the United States was questioned before the Courts of the United States in the case of Gordon Epperly et. al. v. United States /10 wherein each of those Courts ruled within un-published Opinions/Judgments that the questions raised were “political questions” to the Courts (citing Coleman v. Miller11 and United States v. Stahl 12).
Prior to 1939, the Supreme Court for the United States had taken cognizance of a number of diverse objections to the validity of specific amendments. Apart from holding that official notice of ratification by the several States was conclusive upon the courts,13 it had treated these questions as justiciable, although it had uniformly rejected them on the merits. In that year, however, the whole subject was thrown into confusion by the inconclusive decision of Coleman v. Miller.14 This case came up on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Kansas to review the denial of a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Kansas Senate to erase an endorsement on a Resolution ratifying the proposed child labor Amendment to the Constitution of the effect that it had been adopted by the Kansas Senate.
Four opinions were written in the U.S. Supreme Court, no one of which commanded the support of more than four members of the Court. The majority ruled that the Plaintiffs, members
of the Kansas State Senate, had a sufficient interest in the controversy to give the federal courts jurisdiction to review the case. Without agreement with regard to the grounds for their decision, a different majority affirmed the judgment of the Kansas court denying the relief sought.  Four members who concurred in the result had voted to dismiss the writ on the ground that the amending process “is ‘political’ in its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any point.”15
In an opinion reported as “the opinion of the Court,” but in which it appears that only two Justices joined Chief Justice Hughs who wrote it, it was declared that the writ of mandamus was properly denied, because the question whether a reasonable time had elapsed since submission of the proposal was a nonjusticiable political question, the kinds of considerations entering into deciding being fit for Congress to evaluate, and the question of the effect of a previous rejection upon a ratification was similarly nonjusticiable, because the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment precedent of congressional determination “has been accepted.”16 But with respect to the contention that the lieutenant governor should not have been permitted to cast the deciding vote in favor of ratification, the Court found itself evenly divided, thus accepting the judgment of the Kansas Supreme Court that the state officer had acted validly.17 However, the unexplained decision by Chief Justice Hughes and his two concurring Justices that the issue of the lieutenant’ governor’s vote was justiciable indicates at the least that their position was in disagreement with the view of the other four Justices in the majority that all questions surrounding Constitutional Amendments are nonjusticiable.18
However, Coleman does stand as authority for the proposition that at least some decisions with respect to the proposal and ratification of Constitutional Amendments are exclusively within the purview of Congress or the States, either because they are textually committed or because the Courts lack adequate criteria of determination to pass on them.19 But to what extent the political question doctrine encompasses the amendment process and what the standards may be to resolve that particular issue remain elusive of answers.
We can conclude from the cases of Epperly et. al. v. United States (supra.) that the United States Supreme Court has made a determination that any constitutional questions regarding the amending of the U.S. Constitution are “political questions” for the Congress or the States to address.

Historical Background

The historical facts relating to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment have been addressed by the Supreme Court for the State of Utah in the case of Dyett v. Turner; (supra.)20
State v. Phillips;21 and the legal brief of Judge Lander H. Perez of Louisiana as published in the Congressional Record.22
It should be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court declared within the case of State of Texas v. White,23 that a State cannot secede from the Union after being admitted into the Union. The
Supreme Court further ruled that the southern States were States of the Union before the Civil War, the southern States were States of the Union during the Civil War and the southern States were States of the Union after the Civil War.
Your attention is also called that at the time the Civil War was declared to be at an end, the southern States were operating under proper civil governments when the present day Thirteenth Amendment was submitted to those States for ratification.24
The Problem
For the purpose of discussion, we will concentrate on the House Joint Resolution that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 and the Proclamations of
Ratification by Secretary of State, William H. Seward.
Note:
In regard to the Fourteenth Amendment; the Record of the “Congressional Globe” refers to the “Joint Resolution” proposing the Amendment as being H.J.R. 127. The copy of the “Joint
Resolution” that was submitted to the States for Ratification was referred to as H.J.R. 48.
Hereinafter, we will refer to the “Joint Resolution” as H.J.R. 48.
First:
Pretermitting the ineffectiveness of “H.J.R. 48;” seventeen (17) States (four (4) votes are questionable) out of the then thirty-seven (37) States of the Union seventeen (17) States rejected the proposed Fourteenth Amendment between the date of its submission to the States by the Secretary of State on June 16, 1866 and March 24, 1868 thereby further nullifying said Resolution and making it impossible for its ratification by the constitutionally required three-fourths of such States as shown by the rejections thereof by the legislatures of the following States:
Texas rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on October 27, 1866 (House Journal 1866, pgs. 577-584 – Senate Journal 1866, p. 471.).
Georgia rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on November 9, 1866 (House Journal 1866, pgs. 61-69 – Senate Journal 1866, pgs. 65-72.).
Florida rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on December 6, 1866 (House Journal 1866, pgs. 75-80, 138, 144, 149-150 – Senate Journal 1866, pgs. 101-103, 111, 114, 133.).
Alabama rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on December 7, 1866 (House Journal 1866. pgs. 208-213 – Senate Journal 1866, pgs. 182-183.).
North Carolina rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on December 14, 1866 (House Journal 1866 – 1867. pgs. 182-185 – Senate Journal 1866-67, pgs. 91-139).
Arkansas rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on December 17, 1866 (House Journal 1866, pp. 288-291 – Senate Journal 1866, p. 262.).
South Carolina rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on December 20, 1866 (House Journal 1866, p. 284 – Senate Journal 1866, p. 230.).
Kentucky rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on January 8, 1867 (House Journal 1867, pgs. 60-65 – Senate Journal 1867, pgs. 62-65.).
Virginia rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on January 9, 1867 (House Journal 1866-67, p. 108 – Senate Journal 1866-67, pgs. 101-103.).
Louisiana rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on February 9, 1867 (Joint Resolution as recorded on page 9 of the Acts of the General Assembly, Second Session, January 28, 1867)
(McPherson, “Reconstruction,” p. 194; “Annual Encyclopedia,” p. 452.).
Delaware rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on February 7, 1867 (House Journal 1867, pgs. 223-226 – Senate Journal 1867, pgs. 169, 175 176, 208.).
Maryland rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on March 23, 1867 (House Journal 1867, pgs. 1139-1141 – Senate Journal 1867, p. 808.).
Mississippi rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on January 31, 1867 (Laws of Mississippi, 1866-1877, p. 734; House Journal 1867, pgs. 201-202 – Senate Journal 1866, p 195-196)
(McPherson, “Reconstruction,” p. 194.).
Ohio rescinded its Fourteenth Amendment ratification vote on January 15, 1868 (House Journal 1868, pgs. 44-51 – Senate Journal 1868, pgs. 33-39.).
New Jersey rescinded its Fourteenth Amendment ratification vote on March 24, 1868 (Minutes of the Assembly 1868, p. 743 – Senate Journal 1868, p. 356.).
California on March 3rd, 1868, the Assembly, with the Senate concurring, rejected the Fourteenth Amendment (Journal of the Assembly 1867-68, p. 601).
Oregon rejected the Fourteenth Amendment by the Senate on October 6, 1868 and by the House on October 15, 1868 proclaiming the legislature that ratified the Amendment to have
been a “defacto” legislature (U.S. House of Representatives, 40th Congress, 3rd session, Mis. Doc. No 12).
There is no question that all of the southern States [which rejected the Fourteenth Amendment] had legal constituted governments; were fully recognized by the federal government
and were functioning as member States of the Union at the time of their rejection.

Where a proposed Amendment to the Federal Constitution has been rejected by more than one-forth of the States, and rejections have been duly certified, a State which has rejected the proposed Amendment may not change its position, even if it might change its position while the Amendment is still before the people.25
Second:
Several “Reconstruction Acts” were passed by Congress after the Civil War was proclaimed by the President of the United States to be at an end.26 The “Reconstruction Acts” that will be addressed are those that were enacted on March 2, 1867,27 June 25, 1868,28 July 19, 1867,29 March 30, 1870.30 It is obvious that these “Reconstruction Acts” were enacted into law over the veto of the President for the purpose of coercing the southern States into rescinding their vote of rejection of the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867:31
… and when said State, by a vote of its legislature elected under said constitution (state) , shall have adopted the amendment to the Constitution of the United States, proposed by the Thirty-ninth Congress, and known as article fourteen, and when said article shall have become a part of the Constitution of the United States, said State shall be declared entitled to representation in Congress, . . .
The Act of June 25, 186832 to admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina, Louisiana,
Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, to representation in Congress at Section 1:
“That each of the States of (naming them) shall entitled and admitted to representation in
Congress as a State of the Union when the legislature of such State shall have duly ratified the
amendment to the Constitution of the United States proposed by the Thirty-ninth Congress, and
known as the article fourteen, . . .”
The Act of March 30, 187033 admitting the State of Texas to Representation in the Congress
of the United States [Preamble]:
Whereas the people of Texas has framed and adopted a constitution of State government which is republican;
and whereas the legislature of Texas elected under said constitution has ratified the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments to the Constitution of the United States; and whereas the performance of these several acts in
good faith is a condition precedent to the representation of the State in Congress: . . .
From these three Acts of Congress, the questions must be asked: “By what authority did the
Congress rely upon to compel a State to reverse its negative ratification vote?” And: “By what
authority did the Congress rely upon to compel a State to ratify an Amendment to the
Constitution for the United States?”
Third:
The Thirty-ninth Congress declared at Section 1 of the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 186734
that:
. . . That said rebel States shall be divided into military districts and made subject to the military authority
of the United States . . .
and at Section 6 of the same Act:
. . . any civil governments which may exist therein shall be deemed provisional only, and in all respects
subject to the paramount authority of the United States . . .
and at Section 10 of the Reconstruction Act of July 19, 1867:35
That the commander of any district named in said act (March 2, 1867) shall have power . . . to suspend or
remove from office, or from the performance of official duties and the exercise of official powers, any officer
or person holding or exercising, or professing to hold or exercise, any civil or military office or duty in such
district under any power, election, appointment or authority derived from, or granted by, or claimed under,
any so-called State or the government thereof, or any municipal or other division thereof . . .
and at Section 10 of that Act:
That no district commander . . . or any of the officers or appointees acting under them, shall be bound in his
action by any opinion of any civil officer of the United States.
The above Sections of the Reconstruction Acts of March 2, 1867 and July 19, 1867 makes it
very clear that the southern States were under military law and were without republican form of
governments. The question must be asked: “By what authority did the Thirty-ninth Congress rely
upon to impose military law upon those southern States after those States were declared by
“Presidential Proclamation” of June 30, 1865 and “Presidential Proclamation” of August 20, 1866
that the insurrection was at an end, and that peace, order, tranquillity and civil authority existed
in and throughout the whole of the United States of America?” Keep in mind that the military
was originally sent into those States by “Presidential Proclamation” to suppress rebellion within
those States, not by any Act of Congress.
Fourth:
As Section 1 of the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867,36 declares that the southern States had
no legal governments:
Whereas no legal State governments or adequate protection for life or property now exists in the rebel States
of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida, Texas, and
Arkansas; . . .
the question must be asked: “When did the southern States have legal governments?” The
Congress answered the question within: – “An Act to provide for the more efficient Government
of the Rebel States” and within the: – 37 “Act to admit the States of North Carolina, South Carolina,
Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida, to Representation in Congress”38 and within the: – “Act
to admit the State of Texas to Representation in the Congress of the United States”39 wherein the
Congress declared that the southern States were not to be recognized as “States” with lawful civil
governments until said States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. By the mouth of Congress; the
purported votes cast for the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment under the Reconstruction
Acts were cast by unlawful governments of those southern States [military districts].
Fifth:
If the southern States had no legal governments, as declared by Congress; additional
questions must be asked:
Why did the Congress submit the Resolution proposing the Thirteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution to the southern States for ratification?
Why did the Congress accept the southern States “ratification votes” on the Thirteenth
Amendment?
Why did the Congress submit the Resolution proposing the Fourteenth Amendment to the
southern States for ratification?
As both Houses of Congress passed Resolutions40 declaring that the Civil War was not waged
in the spirit of oppression nor for purpose of overthrowing or INTERFERING WITH THE RIGHTS
OF ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONS OF THOSE STATES, why did Congress wait until those southern
States cast a “negative” ratification vote on the Fourteenth Amendment before declaring the civil
governments of those States as being unlawful?
Did the southern States have lawful governments before the enactment of the “Reconstruction
Acts?”
When a freely associated compact State of the united States of America is declared to have
an unlawful civil government by Congress and is placed under “Military Law” – is that State a
“State” as that term is used in U.S. Const., V:1:1?
When a freely associated compact State of the united States of America is placed under
“Military Law” by the Congress – do those States have a Republican form of government as they
are to be guaranteed under U.S. Const., IV:4:1?
Does Congress have the authority to substitute the Republican form of government of a freely
associated compact State of the united States of America with another form of government for
the purpose of compelling ratification of an Amendment to the Constitution for the United
States?
If Congress has the “textually demonstrable commitment” and thus has the exclusive and
plenary powers to declare the southern States to have unlawful civil governments – why did
Congress find the need to submit the “Reconstruction Acts” to the President of the United States
for his signature, a procedure that is governed by U.S. Const., I:7:2?
Sixth:
With the United States Supreme Court’s Dred Scott v. Sanford,41 ruling that a Negro had no
rights under the Constitution for the United States to either obtain rights of citizenship or rights
of suffrage; the “Reconstruction Acts” of 1867 fails on the following grounds:
The “Reconstruction Acts” granted the Negroes of the southern States the rights of holding
public office of Legislator and thus the U.S. Congress granted the Negro population the status of
“citizen” BEFORE the Fourteenth Amendment was proclaimed to be an Amendment to the United
States Constitution.42
The “Reconstruction Acts” granted the Negroes of the southern States the rights of “suffrage”
BEFORE the Fifteenth Amendment was proclaimed to be an Amendment to the United States
Constitution.43
[The Fifteenth Amendment is a formal declaration by the Congress of the United States that
the suffrage provisions within the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 are unconstitutional].
Seventh:
The “Reconstruction Acts” also fails on the following grounds:
The Congress of the United States granted authority to “Military Districts” of the United States
to ratify Amendments to the United States Constitution in violation of U.S. Const., Article V.44
Denied the southern States representation in Congress in violation of Paragraph Two of Article
V of the Articles of Confederation.45
Denied the people of the southern States the privilege of holding an “Office of Trust” if they
were excluded under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment BEFORE the Fourteenth
Amendment was proclaimed to be an Amendment to the United States Constitution.46
Denied the people of the southern States the rights of “suffrage” unless they were qualified
under the Third Article of the Fourteenth Amendment BEFORE the Fourteenth Amendment was
proclaimed to be an Amendment to the United States Constitution.47
The “Reconstruction Acts” fails as Congress had no Constitutional authority to create
governments within a freely associated compact State of the united States of America that
consisted of “Aliens.”48

Eighth:
William H. Seward, as Secretary of State, expressed doubt as to whether three-fourths of the
required States had ratified the Fourteenth Amendment (as shown by his Proclamation of July 20,
1868. /49) Promptly; on July 21, 1868, a Concurrent Resolution /50 was adopted by the Senate and
House of Representatives declaring that three-fourths of the several States of the Union had
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. That Concurrent Resolution; however, was not submitted
to the President of the United States for his approval as required by U.S. Const., I:7:3 and it
included purported ratifications by the unlawful puppet legislatures of five (5) States (Arkansas,
North Carolina, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Alabama) which had previously rejected the
Fourteenth Amendment.51
This Concurrent Resolution assumed to perform the function of the Secretary of State in
whom Congress (by Act of April 20, 1818) had vested the function of issuing such Proclamation
declaring the ratification of Constitutional Amendments.
The Secretary of State bowed to the action of Congress and issued his Proclamation on July
28, 1868 in which he stated that he was acting 52 under the mandate of the Congressional Act of
July 21, 1868:
Now, therefore, be it known that I, William H. Seward, Secretary of State of the United States, in execution
of the aforesaid act, (April 20, 1818) and of the afore-said concurrent resolution of the 21st of July, 1868, and
in conformance thereto, do hereby direct the said proposed amendment (Fourteenth Amendment) to the
Constitution of the United States to be published in the newspapers authorized to promulgate the laws of the
United States, and I do hereby certify that the said proposed amendment has been adopted in the manner
hereinbefore mentioned by the States specified in the said concurrent resolution, namely [naming them]; the
States thus specified being more than three fourths of the States of the United States. . . .
In regard to the Concurrent Resolution of July 21, 1868 – By what authority did the Congress
rely upon to make a determination as to what States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment?
As the power to ratify Amendments to the Constitution for the United States is with the
several States of the Union, by what authority did the Secretary of State, William H. Seward, rely
upon to declare that the Concurrent Resolution of July 21, 1868 was an “Official Notice” of
ratification?
In regard to the Concurrent Resolution of July 21, 1868 – By what authority did the Congress
rely upon to perform the function of the Secretary of State in whom Congress (by Act of April 20,
1818) had vested the function of issuing Proclamations declaring the ratification of Constitutional
Amendments?
In regard to the Concurrent Resolution of July 21, 1868 – By what authority did the Congress
rely upon to declare that the Secretary of State shall issue forth the Proclamation of Ratification
of July 28, 186853 when the Concurrent Resolution of July 21, 1868 was never submitted to the
President of the United States for his approbation as required by the U.S. Constitution?
Within the Proclamation of Ratification of July 20, 186854 – U.S. Secretary of State, William H.
Seward, expressed reservations as to the legitimacy of the governments of those southern States
that were under the military government of the United States and what were his responsibilities
in making legal determinations regarding the ratification votes of those States. The question
must be asked: “Who has the authority to make legal determinations regarding the ratification
of Amendments to the Constitution for the United States?”
The questions presented needs to be answered and without answers, the declared ratification
of the Fourteenth Amendment must be found “ultra vires” and void “ab initio.”
The federal Courts of Coleman v. United States,55 United States v. Stahl56 and Epperly et.al.
v. United States57 have declared that all issues pertaining to amending of the U.S. Constitution
are “political questions” for Congress or the States to address. As the Congress of the United
States of America on several occasions over the past 100 years -refused- to address the questions
presented, the Congress has taken the position that under Article V58 of the Constitution for the
United States of America and Article X59 of the Bill of Rights, the legislatures of the States have
the “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issues.” It is THE PEOPLE IN A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OR THE LEGISLATURES OF THE SEVERAL STATES THAT HAVE
THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE IF AN AMENDMENT HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN ACCORDANCE TO
THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
United States Constitution
The
Fourteenth Amendment
[FICTION OR FACT]
The validity, or should we say invalidity, of the Civil War Amendments is very important to
reinstating the inalienable rights of free white Citizens in the United States of America. At every
juncture where the government of the United States of America and/or the governments of the
several States attempt to usurp inalienable rights, the Civil War Amendments are ultimately
claimed to be the authority for such deprivations of rights.
To determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment is fiction or fact, we will proceed to dissect
each Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, sentence by sentence. Please remember that the
following Authorities reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers at the time the
Constitution for the United States was adopted, and although they may not be “politically” correct
today, the Authorities represents the law at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was
(purportedly) adopted.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT – SECTION ONE
We begin with Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment which reads:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, United States Constitution
The first sentence of Section One provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, … – Fourteenth Amendment, Section One
Notice there is no relation to race and there is no definition of person, other than the “p” in
person is not capitalized, indicating the word would not mean a “Natural Person,” but a “juristic
person” or “artificial person.” As the courts have said, the “due process” and “equal protection”
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to Corporations which are juristic (artificial) persons.
Compare this with Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 of the Constitution for the United States of
America:
No Person except a natural born Citizen, …
Notice the “N” in “no”, the “P” in “Person” and the “C” in “Citizen.” All of the capitalization is on the
object to be distinguished as to who is a Natural Person. This is further clarified in Amy v.
Smith:60
Free negroes and mulattoes are, almost everywhere, considered and treated as a degraded race of people;
insomuch so, that, under the constitution and laws of the United States, they can not become citizens of the
United States. – Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. Ky. R. 334.
In light of this, no person would be considered as a United States Citizen or a citizen of the
United States; as the Constitution was framed to incorporate the common law, in opposition to
international law.
common law – one race governs;
international law – all races govern.
The capitalization of the words “Person” and “Citizen” could mean only one thing, the denoting
of only those of one race in compliance with the common law.
The American colonies brought with them the common, and not the civil law; and each state at the revolution,
adopted either more or less of it, and not one of them exploded the principle, that place of birth conferred
citizenship. – Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. Ky. R. 337-38.

Under the common-law (and under American Constitutions), “Citizenship” was dependent
upon right of inheritance which can only be passed by lineage (race). This is in accord with the
Preamble (Constitution for the United States of America), which states that the Constitution was
adopted for the protection of “We The People” and “their posterity,” – posterity – being a racial
term.
The “p” in “persons” of the Fourteenth Amendment is not referring to those referred to in
Article IV, Section 2, Constitution for the United States of America.
… and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, …
Notice the word: “subject.” Those that were not of the white race (when the Fourteenth
Amendment was proposed) were natural born “subjects.”
Blacks, whether born or in bondage, if born under the jurisdiction and allegiance of the United States, are
natives, and not aliens. They are what the common law terms natural-born subjects … The better opinion,
I should think, was, that Negroes or other slaves, born within and under the allegiance of the United States,
are natural-born subjects, but not citizens. Citizens, under our constitution and laws, mean free inhabitants,
born within the United States, or naturalized under the law of Congress …Commentaries of American Law,
James Kent, 7th Ed., Vol. II, at 275-78.
Thus, we find the meaning and application of the terms: “subject to the jurisdiction.”
A United States “Citizen” (that is a common-law Citizen in one of the several States at the
adoption of the Constitution for the United States of America) was considered “within” the
jurisdiction of the United States. “Citizens” were never subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. Instead, the United States was subject to the jurisdiction of the Citizen, that is, under the
common law. [See the tenth Article in Amendment, Constitution for the United States of
America].
According to the common law principle (upon which our Constitution was founded), only the
race (family) of people forming the sovereignty to adopt the Constitution (We the People) are
considered “Citizens.” All others born inside the Country and owing allegiance to “We the People”
are natural born “Subjects.” Under principles of International Law, that is, inter-racial law (See
definition in Webster’s Dictionary, [1828]), these “Subjects” (who, by special privilege, are licensed
to become something or do something normally illegal under the common-law), are said to be
“citizens” and “persons.”
But in considering the question before us, it must be borne in mind that there is no law of nations standing
between the people of the United States and their Government, and interfering with their relation to each
other. The powers of the government, and the rights of the citizens under it, are positive and practical
regulations plainly written down. The people of the United States have delegated to it certain enumerated
powers, and forbidden it to exercise others. – Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1856-1857) 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393, 452,
15 L.Ed. 691.
It is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment could not be referring to the “Citizens” that are
known of the white race, but must be referring to those artificial “citizens” of the non-white races
… are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside … – Fourteenth Amendment, Section
1.
This sentence is interesting, as it not only declares that these “persons” (small “p”) are
“citizens” (small “c”) of the United States, but also of the State they choose to reside in:
No white person born within the limits of the United States, … or born without those limits, and subsequently
naturalized under their laws, owes the status of citizenship to the recent Amendments to the Federal
Constitution. – Van Valkenburg v. Brown, (1872) 43 Cal 43, 47.
Prior to the adoption of this amendment, strictly speaking, there were no citizens of the United States, but
only some one of them. Congress had the power ‘to establish an uniform rule of naturalization,’ but not the
power to make a naturalized alien a citizen of any state. But the states generally provided that such persons
might, on sufficient residence therein, become citizens thereof, and then the courts held, ab convenienti,
rather than otherwise, that they became ipso facto citizens of the United States. – Sharon v. Hill, (1885) 26
F 337, 343.
Notice the words: “some one of them.” This refers to citizenship of “some one” of the States.
The national government had no power to make citizens of its own and force them upon the
States. The States could make anyone they chose to be a citizen of their State, but only those of
the white race could be recognized as national citizens under the Preamble to the Constitution
for the United States of America and be treated as “Citizens” in any State they entered.
Thus, only white State citizens held the privileges and immunities known to Article IV, Section
2, among the several States, and no State could confer that Constitutional protection on any
other race. In consequence thereof, the “also” could not authorize a “non-white” to be an “Officer”
of the United States government. These elements were what was referred to as “national
citizenship” (prior to the Fourteenth Amendment) to avoid one State (or the States collectively
at the national level) from interfering in another State’s sovereignty, or the sovereignty “We the
People”.
The Fourteenth Amendment attempts to reverse this natural common-law order of things by
making State citizenship dependent upon national citizenship.
… By the original constitution, citizenship in the United States was a consequence of citizenship in a state.
By this clause [Am 14, Sec 1] this order of things is reversed. Citizenship in the United States is defined; it is
made independent of citizenship in a state, and citizenship in a state is a result of citizenship in the United
States. So that a person born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, is, without
reference to state constitutions or laws, entitled to all privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution
of the United States to citizens thereof. – U.S. v. Hall, (1871) 26 Fed. Case 79, 81.
Prior to the adoption of this amendment, strictly speaking, there were no citizens of the United States, but
only some one of them. Congress had the power “to establish an uniform rule of naturalization,” but not the
power to make a naturalized alien a citizen of any state. But the states generally provided that such persons
might, on sufficient residence therein, become citizens thereof, and then the courts held, ab convenienti,
rather than otherwise, that they became ipso facto citizens of the United States. – Sharon v. Hill, (1885) 26
F 337, 343.

Notice the words “ab convenienti,” which means after the event. This means after the
Constitutional Convention. And the words “ipso facto,” which interprets as after the sovereignty
was established, (composed only of members of the white race [family]).
The choice of words here is interesting, as they did not use the words: “nunc pro tunc,” which
means to do what should have been done in the beginning. In other words, they are not saying
they made a mistake by not including other races when the Constitution was framed. They are
only claiming to changed the order of things, regardless of the correctness of the original
circumstance.
This Section of the Fourteenth Amendment totally dissolves the State’s (people of the State)
right to declare its own sovereign body. It is in violation of “State Sovereignty” and completely
violates Article IV, Sections 2 and 4, and the Ninth and Tenth Articles in Amendment.
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found
in another State, shall, on demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered
up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in
Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due. – Constitution for the United
States of America, Article IV, Section 2.
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people. – Ninth Article in Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America.
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. – Tenth Article in Amendment to the Constitution for the
United States of America.
To understand that not only Article IV, but all other Articles (I through VII) were written only
for the government of and for the white race (thereby barring those not of the white race from
coming under their protection), you are referred to the case of Crandall v. Connecticut:61
The first Congress after the constitution was adopted, was composed of many of those distinguished patriots,
who framed the constitution, and from that circumstance would be supposed to know what its spirit was.
Some of the earliest work they performed for the country, was to establish by law a uniform rule of
naturalization. The first law was by Congress in 1790, and in its precise and technical language is used: ‘Any
alien, being a free white person, may become a citizen, by complying with the requirements hereinafter
named.’ In the year 1795, a further regulation was made by law, when the same language was used: ‘Any
free white person may become a citizen,’ &c. In 1798-1802-1813, and 1824, similar laws were passed, on the
same subject, and in each of those laws, the same technical language is used. These laws were carrying into
effect the constitution itself; and if the constitution in any part of it embraced coloured persons as citizens,
then Congress mistook its duty, and early departed from its provisions. Congress have also marked this
distinction of colour in the post-office laws ‘No person of colour can be engaged in the post-office, or in the
transportation of mail.’ This is a right open to all but persons of colour. – Crandall v. Connecticut, (1834) 10
Conn 358.
To my mind, it would be a perversion of terms, and the well known rule of construction, to say, that slaves,
free blacks, or Indians, were citizens, within the meaning of that term, as used in the constitution. God forbid
that I should add to the degradation of this race of men; but I am bound, by my duty, to say, they are not
citizens. I have thus shown you that this law is not contrary to the 2d section of the 4th art. of the constitution
of the United States; for that embraces only citizens. – Ibid, at 347.
Note the word “citizen” as it used in Crandall. For the definition of the word “citizen”, we refer
you to Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 8th Ed., (1859):
CITIZEN, persons. 3. All natives are not citizens of the United States; the descendants of the aborigines, and
those of African origin, are not entitled to the rights of citizens. Anterior to the adoption of the constitution
of the United States, each State had the right to make citizens of such persons as it pleased. That constitution
does not authorize any but white persons to become citizens of the United States; and it must therefore be
presumed that no one is a citizen who is not white. – Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 8th Ed. (1859), Title “Citizen,”
p. 231.
CITIZEN, persons. 2. Citizens are either native born or naturalized. Native citizens may fill any office;
naturalized citizens may be elected or appointed to any office under the constitution of the United States,
except the office of president and vice-president. The constitution provides, that ‘the citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.’ – Ibid, at p. 231.
This leaves no doubt who (under the organic law of this Nation) are solely defined as “Citizens”
(Persons), or what race is the sovereign body. No one else is included. The Fourteenth
Amendment is an attempt to unseat the organic law and we should question any and all
government Officials who would condone this type of deception.
Notice in government reprints of the Constitution for the United States of America, Article I,
Section 2, Clause 3:
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within
this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number
of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
fifths of all other Persons. – Constitution for the United States of America, Article I, Section 2, Clause 3.
Upon checking the Constitution for the Confederate States of America, the people of the
Confederacy (who knew and understood the organic law of this Nation) re-worded the Preamble
and Article I, Section 2, Clause 3, as follows:
We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its sovereign and independent character, in
order to form a permanent federal government, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, and secure the
blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity — invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God – do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the Confederate States of America. – Preamble to the Constitution
for the Confederate States of America.
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States, which may be included
within this Confederacy, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined, by adding to the
whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians
not taxed, three-fifths of all slaves. – Constitution for the Confederate States of America, Article I, Section 2,
Clause 3.
Notice “We, the people” and “to ourselves and our posterity” were preserved. Also, notice the
substitution of the word: “Persons” for that of the word: “slaves.”
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; … – Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1.
This sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, makes all State Constitutions which
set their sovereign body as the white race only (such as Oregon’s Constitution) null and void.
In all elections not otherwise provided for by this constitution, every white male citizen of the United States,
… – Oregon Constitution, (1859) Article II, Section 2.
and others, such as:
The electors or members of the general assembly shall be free white male citizens of the State, … – Georgia
Constitution, (1865) Article V, Section 1.
Every free white man at the age of twenty-one years being a native or naturalized citizen of the United
States,… – North Carolina Constitution, (1856) Article I, Section 3, Clause 2.
Every white male citizen of the commonwealth, resident therein, aged twenty-one years and upwards, being
qualified to exercise the right of suffrage … – Virginia Constitution, (1830) Article III, Section 14.
That every white male citizen of this State, above twenty-one years of age, and neither, having resided twelve
months within the State, and six months in the county, … – Maryland Constitution, (1810) Article 14.
All elections of governor, senators, and representatives shall be by ballot. And in such elections every white
free man of the age of twenty-one years, … – Delaware Constitution, (1792) Article IV, Section 1.
See Neal v. Delaware, as to nullification 62 of State Constitutions under the Fourteenth
Amendment.

All of these provisions of the Constitutions for the States are now “null and void” if the
Fourteenth Amendment is considered as a valid Amendment to the Constitution for the United
States of America (which it certainly is not). No State legislature could change the governing class
which put the legislature into being and which class was set in their own State Constitution.
Here we must also note the difference between the Fourteenth Amendment’s “privileges and
immunities” Clause and the “privileges and immunities” Clause of Article IV, Section 2. (See
Maxwell v. Dow,63).
… nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. – Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1.
Notice how close the wording of this sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment is to the
wording of the fifth Article in Amendment:
… nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation. – Fifth Article in Amendment, Constitution for the United States of America.
Notice the Fourteenth Amendment deviates from the fifth Article in Amendment on the issue
of compensation. The Fourteenth Amendment says, “equal protection,” where the fifth Article in
Amendment says, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
The problem (it appears) in this change of wording is to give martial law properties to the fifth
Article in Amendment, thereby converting the common-law remedial effect of the fifth Article in
Amendment, to a martial law remedy. This could be why the courts use the word “purview” when
referencing the Articles in Amendment (Articles One through Eight) in relation to the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Purview. Enacting part of a statute, in contradistinction to the preamble. The part of a statute commencing
with the words ‘Be it enacted,’ and continuing as far as the repealing clause; and hence, the design,
contemplation, purpose, or scope of the act. – Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. (1979).
It appears that when the Judges speak of any common-law remedy, principle, or maxim, as
being within “purview” of the Fourteenth Amendment, they are converting a common-law remedy,
principle, or maxim, to a martial law remedy, principle, or maxim of law. In such cases, the
common law remedy, principle, or maxim is eliminated and, of course, the unalienable rights of
the Citizen are also eliminated (in favor of martial law rule).
This conversion of the common law to properties of martial law nature is obvious. The
Fourteenth Amendment (with military force to enforce it) allows all races to govern. A maxim
which violates the common-law with the power (force) of martial law.
According to these principles, we must take another look at this portion of the Fourteenth
Amendment. What is “due process” under the Fourteenth Amendment? Amazingly enough, “due
process” is completely defined within the Amendment by the integral words that follow those very
terms, “equal protection of the laws.”
Nothing more than “equal protection of the law” is required to satisfy the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, equal tyranny and deprivation of common-law rights to all
meets the equal protection principle. So, what protection is given? Answer: As much as the
national government wishes to give, and no more. Congressional protection can be enlarged and
contracted as much as Congress and Administrative Agencies wish, provided only that these
changes affect all equally. If everyone is chained to a post for their own protection, then they
have “equal protection of the law” under the law martial.
To see the clear and inherent weakness of the “Due Process Clause” of the Fourteenth
Amendment, we look below to find that the common-law principles clearly known to the Bill of
Rights do not apply to the Fourteenth Amendment and “Due Process.”
The right of trial by jury in civil cases, guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment (Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 US 90),
and the right to bear arms guaranteed by the Second Amendment (Presser v. Illinois, 116 US 252), have been
distinctly held not to be privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by the States, and in effect the same decision was made in
respect of the guarantee against prosecution, except by indictment by grand jury, contained in the Fifth
Amendment (Hurtado v. California, 110 US 516), and in respect of the right to be confronted with witnesses,
contained in the Sixth Amendment. (West v. Louisiana, 194 US 258). In Maxwell v. Dow, supra, where the
plaintiff in error had been convicted in a state court of a felony upon information and by a jury of eight
persons, it was held that the indictment, made indispensable by the Fifth Amendment, and the trial by jury
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, were not privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as
those words were used in the Fourteenth Amendment … the decision rested upon the ground that this clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not forbid the States to abridge the personal rights enumerated in the first
eight Amendments, because these rights were not within the meaning of the clause ‘privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States.’ … We conclude, therefore, that the exemption from compulsory
self-incrimination is not a privilege or immunity of National citizenship guaranteed by this clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by the States…
… it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments against National
action may also be safeguarded against State action, because a denial of them would be a denial of due
process of law … If this is so, it is not because those rights are enumerated in the first eight Amendments,
but because they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of law. -
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98-99, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97.
Therefore, any reference to Amendments One through Eight, (when applied to the State, or
through purview of the Fourteenth Amendment in any way) replaces the common law thereof
with martial law. This is pure theft of our God given common law birthright. The first Section
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose is to:
1. Convert common-law Citizens to statutory citizens and statutory persons under martial
law rule; and,
2. Convert common-law remedies, principles, and maxims in Articles One through Ten in
Amendment to martial law remedies, principles, and maxims through the Fourteenth
Amendment; and,
3. Convert common-law rights to ownership of property to martial law confiscation of
property, in which a private citizen is not capable of protecting his property under the
common-law; and,
4. Completely remove the common-law jurisdiction from the original people and their
Posterity and convert them to Statutory Persons who can be brought within purview of
the Fourteenth Amendment under national, international, martial law rule; and,
5. Completely destroy the restrictions on those not of the white race to enter our Nation and
dislodge the people mentioned in the Preamble as the governing body of this white
Nation; and,
6. Completely destroy the ability of the said people to govern by allowing those not of our
race to hold elected Office, both State and National.
All this is done with the intention of breaking down State sovereignty by an increased power
of the national side of the United States government with a corresponding loss of power for State
sovereignty on the federal side of the United States. This leaves the existence of the United
States government less dependent (or not dependent at all) upon the existence of the several
States.
The Fourteenth Amendment set the stage for the destruction of “white rule” under Christian
doctrine in the United States of America.
Ultimately, they will not succeed, as God has designated this land for the regathering of the
twelve tribes of Israel to become a mighty Nation again, and so it will be as God has proclaimed.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT – SECTION TWO
The next Section of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:
Sec. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers,
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-president of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens
of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis
for representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall
bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. – Fourteenth Amendment,
Section 2.
The purpose of the initial sentence of section Two is clear by its own terms: “Representatives
shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting
the whole number of persons in each State, . . .” The intention is to give those persons
(previously known as “chattels”) a “whole” character and to give that character representation as
a “citizen;” accordingly, allowing the States to claim those persons for purposes of representation
in the United States government. [Elk v. Wilkins64].

What does the original Constitution say on the subject?
Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within
this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number
of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three
fifths of all other Persons. – Article I, Section 2, Clause 3, Constitution for the United States of America.
Under Article I, Section 2, Clause 3, we can see that the Framers understood that they would
not allow the direct taxation of property in the several States (by the United States) by excluding
those persons held in servitude as “property” from apportionment for direct taxes. The only
exception made was that of counting those persons at three-fifths of their actual enumeration and
adding that to the whole number of free persons.
At the time of adoption of the Constitution for the United States of America, the southern
States feared that they would be powerless in the new government due to low population of free
persons in those States. A compromise was struck which allowed additional representation for
the populace held as slaves with a corresponding increase in taxation for the additional
representation. This carried two benefits with the new government:
1. More revenue would be generated by the United States from these States; and,
2. These States would be more likely to ratify the Constitution, having more equal authority
in the central government. But even here, representation and direct taxes were not
considered on the same level. [See: 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 195 (1906)].
The first sentence of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment is wholly in conflict with, and
in contradiction to, Article I, Section 2, Clause 3, as well as the Preamble. The only reason these
persons (Slaves) were even given a three-fifths character in the United States Census was for the
purpose of taxation (which incidentally, prevented the slave States from suffering a lack of
sufficient representation in the United States House of Representatives). By no means was this
three-fifths character to imply any direct representation of the persons to whom it related. [See:
8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 107 (1906)].
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, if any State refuses to give this class “suffrage” in State
elections (by the terms of Section Two [14th Am.]), a disability is imposed. When this disability
is imposed, the State subjected to the disability loses the three-fifths representation it had based
upon the number of such “persons” and for that reason is repugnant to the organic law.
Rather than returning a State to its original standing or representation under Article I (by
counting non-whites as three-fifths for purposes of taxation and incidental representation), the
uncooperative State is forced into the very condition the Framers of the Constitution intended
to prevent by the compromise struck at the Constitutional Convention. And since Section Two
of the Fourteenth Amendment makes no mention of taxation, it is presumable that the State
would still be taxed according to at least three-fifths apportionment for the number of those
persons inhabiting the State, an unequal taxation never intended. [See The Federalist, No. 34].
Moreover, without the three-fifths disability place upon non-whites, the people mentioned
in the Preamble to the Constitution for the United States of America, (or rather, their “Posterity”)
no longer can maintain their superior character over their own governmental affairs as the
founders and sovereignty of the government. This amounts to no less than allowance of a foreign
invasion into the several States of the Union, sanctioned by Congressional (State and Federal)
legislation against the people of the States in violation of their respective sovereignties.
One thing that must be noted: Although this disability would be imposed upon the States that
were uncooperative, they could still deny “suffrage” to the “Subjects” of the United States.
In Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, “Indians not taxed” were still excluded as they
are in Article I, Section 2, Clause 3. The reason “Indians not taxed” (taken) were still excluded is
because of their allegiance to, and membership in, a separate racial sovereignty, that is, the Indian
Nations. [See, 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 626].
The court of Elk v. Wilkins, later de 65 termined that holding Indians outside the consideration
for representation was wholly inconsistent with destruction of racial distinction proposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. It is speculated that this decision was made because to decide
otherwise, would reveal the racial sovereignty principles of the U.S. Constitution in Article I,
Section 2, Clause 3 and the Preamble. The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to destroy
the common-law ideal that each race (enlarged family) constituted a separate sovereignty in their
own governments. It should be noted that this principle (destruction of racial recognition) has
now been extended to all races, including artificial juristic persons (corporations etc.) even
though the Fourteenth Amendment initially was put into existence on the proposition that it was
only intended to benefit the African race.
“The Fourteenth Amendment is to be liberally construed to carry out the purpose of its framers, but it is not
to be restricted in its application because designed originally to rectify an existing wrong. The amendment
was adopted soon after the close of the civil war, and undoubtedly had its origin in a purpose to secure the
newly made citizens in the full enjoyment of their freedom. But it is in no respect limited in its operation to
them. It is universal in its application, extending its protective force over all men, of every race and color,
within the jurisdiction of the States throughout the broad domain of the Republic. – 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 256;
See also, authorities cited therein.
It is no wonder that this Amendment has been held to apply to artificial (juristic) persons since
its purpose was to artificially (by operation or fiction of law) confer citizenship on classes never
recognized as “Citizens” under common-law principles that are based upon the natural law.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT – SECTION THREE
Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads:
Sec. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President,
or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State
legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. – Fourteenth
Amendment, Section 3.
This provision, at first glance, was obviously intended to punish the active southern
participants in the Civil War. But this Section (like the rest of the Fourteenth Amendment) later
proved to deprive the rights of Citizens in the (so-called) northern States as well. For instance,
under this Section, Congress enacted legislation requiring Citizens to take an “Oath of Allegiance”
before being allowed to vote (thus interfering with their right of suffrage and exercise of
sovereignty and before obtaining judgments in the courts of the United States [thus interfering
with the Citizens right to obtain remedy]).
The “Oath” spoken of was created during the Civil War and continued thereafter under the
martial law of this Section of the Fourteenth Amendment. It was created with the intent to
circumvent any exercise of State sovereignty, either by Conventions of the People of the State or
by “Acts” of their legislature which could interfere with the unauthorized superiority exercised by
the United States government through the force of martial law.
… it shall be the duty of the heads of the several departments to cause to be administered to each and every
officer, clerk, or employee, now in their respective departments, or in any way connected therewith, or who
shall hereafter in any way become connected therewith, to following oath, viz.: “I do solemnly swear (or
affirm, as the case may be) that I will support, protect, and defend the Constitution and Government of the
United States against all enemies, whether domestic or foreign, and that I will bear true faith, allegiance,
and loyalty to the same, any ordinance, resolution, or law of any State Convention or Legislature to the
contrary notwithstanding; and, further, that I do this with a full determination, pledge, and purpose, without
any mental reservation or evasion whatsoever; and, further, that I will well and faithfully perform all the
duties which may be required of me by law. So help me God.
And that each and every such civil officer and employee, in the departments aforesaid, or in any way
connected therewith, in the service or employment of the United States, who shall refuse to take the oath or
affirmation herein provided, shall be immediately dismissed and discharged from such service or
employment.
An Act requiring an Oath of Allegiance, and to support the Constitution of the United States, to be
administered to certain Persons in the Civil Service of the United States. – Approved August 6, 1861, Ch. 64,
Section 1, 12 Stat. 326.
Also see the “Oath” prescribed for West Point Cadets in “An Act providing for the better
Organization of the Military Establishment.” Approved August 3, 186166
The “Oath of Allegiance” was also used in many other relations. To obtain a “Judgment” in the
courts of the United States (and to raise claims in its departments and bureaus, for instance),
Congress enacted:
. . . the commanders of all American vessels sailing from ports in the United States to foreign ports, during
the continuance of the present rebellion, and all persons prosecuting claims either as attorney or on his own
account, before any of the departments or bureaus of the United States, shall be require to take the oath of
allegiance, and to support the Constitution of the United States (or affirm, as the case may be,) as required
of persons in the civil service of the United States, by the provisions of the act of Congress approved August
Sixth, eighteen hundred and sixty one. . . .
An Act requiring the Commanders of American Vessels sailing to foreign ports and Persons prosecuting
Claims, to take the Oath of Allegiance. – Approved July 17, 1862, Ch. 205, Sect. 1, 12 Stat. 610.
. . . . Provided, however, That in order to authorize the said court to render a judgment in favor of any
claimant, if a citizen of the United States, it shall be set forth in the petition that the claimant, and the
original and every prior owner thereof where the claim has been assigned, has at all times borne true
allegiance to the Government of the United States, and whether a citizen or not, that he has not in any way
voluntarily aided, abetted, or given encouragement to rebellion against the said Government, which
allegations may be traversed by the Government, and if on the trial such issue shall be decided against the
claimant, his petition shall be dismissed. An Act to amend.
An Act to establish for Investigation of Claims against the United States,” approved February twenty-fourth,
eighteen hundred and fifty-five. – Approved March 3, 1863, Ch. 152, Sect. 12, 12 Stat. 765, 767.
… Whenever it shall be material in any suit or claim before any court to ascertain whether any person or
party asserting the loyalty of any such person to the United States during such rebellion, shall be required
to prove affirmatively that such person did, during said rebellion, consistently adhere to the United States
and did give no aid or comfort to persons engaged in said rebellion; and the voluntary residence of any such
person in any place where, at any time during such residence, the rebel force or organization held sway, shall
be prima facie evidence that such person did give aid and comfort to said rebellion and to the persons
engaged therein.
An Act to provide for Appeals from the Court of Claims, and for other Purposes. – Approved June 25, 1868, Ch.
71, Sec. 3, 15 Stat. 75.

Also see: “An Act making Appropriations for the legislative, executive, and judicial Expenses
of the Government for the Year ending the thirteenth of June, eighteen hundred and seventy-one.”
Approved July 12, 187067
All of these “Acts” of martial law that require an “Oath of Allegiance” from the people who are
already “Citizens” within the original meaning of the Constitution, are given a continuing affect
through Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under these “Acts” created under Section
Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, Citizens are (or could be) treated as being “guilty” of
insurrection or rebellion until they prove themselves innocent. This is again a reversal of the
common-law maxim that one is innocent until proven guilty and contrary to the intent of the fifth
Article in Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America.
For those who may take offense to the use of the terms “Civil War” (as opposed to “the war
between the States”), we will continue to use those terms for a reason. The cause of this War was
the attempt of the national government to interfere in the sovereignty of the several States
through National Civil Law; thus, the actual controversy (”political” as well as “military”) is known
as the “Civil War.”
This was a War over the intrusion of Civil Law upon the Common Law. The court of Diamond
v. Harris,68 calls the Civil Law (statutory law) “superior equity”:
It is difficult to see how the courts of this State are to ignore the common law as a rule of decision, when it
is made so by statute, and adopt the civil law, even though it have the merit of superior equity. – Diamond
v. Harris, (1830) 33 Tex 634, 638.
In the meantime, “Civil Law” was the form of law imposed in the Roman Empire which was
largely (if not wholly) governed by martial law rule.
“Equity” has always been understood to follow the law; to have “superior equity,” is to turn
things on their head. This is exactly what happens when martial law is imposed. If “equity” is the
law, then it follows its own course rather than following the common law, thereby destroying the
common law and leaving what is called “equity” in its place. We can’t even begin to count the
number of times Judges, Lawyers, and Statesmen have said:
“There isn’t any common law anymore. It has been replaced by Statutes.”
They would be more truthful if they said:
“There isn’t any common-law any more, it has been replaced by martial law.”
The 1789 Judiciary Act, Section 1669 prevented the courts of the United States from
entertaining a suit in equity where there was an adequate remedy at law.
Sec. 16. And be it further enacted, That suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the courts of the
United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law. – An Act to
establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, Approved September 24, 1789, Ch. 20, Section 16, 1 Stat.
73, 82.
This statute was taken from a principle well known to the common law and was made by men
who participated in the creation of our Constitution. The Civil Law that followed the Civil War
is found to be this so-called “Superior Equity” instituted under the police power created in the
Fourteenth and related Amendments. This so-called “superior equity” can only be imposed under
conditions of “martial law rule” where the law is in suspension.
If the judiciary has no right to proceed in equity when the law provides adequate remedy, how
does the Congress propose to statute the principles of equity, and then claim to have made law?
It would seem that such a practice is wholly unlawful (in light of legal principles known to the
Constitution and to the several States at the time of its adoption).
As well, it must be noted that “martial law” is known (for the most part) to follow the course
set by men rather that the course set by law (its jurisdiction being based on “force” and coerced
consent). Even where concerned, it must be justified by those imposing it or they eventually will
be held liable for damages caused by its imposition.
What is called ‘proclaiming martial law’ is no law at all; but merely for the sake of public safety, in
circumstances of great emergency, setting aside all law, and acting under military power; a proceeding which
requires to be followed by an act of indemnity when the disturbances are at an end. – 8 Atty. Gen. Op. 365,
367, February 3, 1857.
The Framers understood Common-Law to be superior law in all areas where it could be given
effect. In fact, the Constitution for the United States of America incorporates the Common-Law
in many of its provisions by using Common-Law terms which only the Common-Law can define.
It should not be forgotten, that the first laws of the United States carry great weight in
construction of the powers given in the Constitution for the United States of America, (as well as
the lawful manner of instituting those powers.70).
To all this mass of proof we have still to add, that Congress has repeatedly legislated upon the same
construction of the Constitution that we have given. Three laws, two of which were passed almost
immediately after the Government went into operation, will be abundantly sufficient to show this. The two
first are particularly
worthy of notice, because many of the men who assisted in framing the Constitution,
and took an active part in procuring its adoption, were then in the halls of legislation, and certainly
understood what they meant when they used the words ‘people of the United States’ and ‘citizen’ in that well
considered instrument. – Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1856 – 1857), 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393, 419, 15 L.Ed. 691.
While the distinction between “law” and “equity” are now claimed to be abolished by Rule 1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the combining of both jurisdictions under a singular procedure
could only be done outside the judicial power under martial law rule. Some courts still seem to
recognize some distinctions in law and equity (possibly to avoid explaining the damage done to
the judicial power by this combination).
Getting back to the point, from Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment we can see that
the southern States would be disabled from recovering their sovereignty by propositions of this
Section (because all that were sympathetic to their cause would be [and were] refused “Office” in
the United States government). This was necessary for the northern Revolutionaries to maintain
the results of their usurpation of the Preamble to the Constitution and their imposition of “martial
law.”
According to McKee v. Young,71 all that is necessary to constitute: “Aid and comfort” (as known
in Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment) is giving the enemy words of encouragement or
expression of favorable opinion while occupying an influential position.72 From this it is obvious
that southern Public Officials were targeted for punishment for their attempts to maintain the
power of the Preamble to the Constitution for the United States of America (as well as the
principles of the Federal government known to and required by that instrument).
NOTE: Secession of the southern States is not condoned, but a recognition that the south
seceded due to the usurpatious Acts pursued by the national government is intended. The
several States did have the right to withdraw their Senators from the national government
to suspend its operation until such time as it conformed itself to the requirements of the
Constitution. It appears that secession was used by the northern Revolutionaries as
justification for the acts of a usurpatious national government. This mistake should never
be repeated.
It has been said that the Thirteenth Amendment (and subsequent Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution) bear the same authority as other provisions of the Constitution (being Amendments
thereto) rather than bearing the inferior quality of “statutes” which may be considered “void” when
made without authority of the Constitution as adopted.
Not only are these Amendments contrary to the original intent of the Framers, (which
recognized only a white sovereignty [We the people]), but even Congress has treated the
Fourteenth Amendment as a mere statute. It is well known that the Constitution for the United
States of America may not be amended by statute. [Article V, Constitution for the United States
of America]. It is presumable that Congress fully understands this fact. “An Act of Congress”
Approved June 6, 1898,73 provides:
. . . that the disability imposed by Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
heretofore incurred is hereby removed.
According to Marbury v. Madison,74 either the Constitution is the supreme and paramount
law, unchangeable by mere legislative enactment, or it is a futile attempt by the people to control
their government. Either the Fourteenth Amendment has no more standing than a statute or it
violates the principles of government proposed by the original Constitution by allowing Congress
to change its provisions by its own legislative authority. [See Rogers v. Bellei75 (Dissenting
Opinion), as to Congress changing the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment by mere legislation].
This being the case, the Fourteenth Amendment must be something less than organic law.
Ironically enough, Madison (the Defendant in Marbury v. Madison [supra.]) in the
Constitutional Convention (while moving for the ratification of the Constitution by the people
rather than the State legislatures) agreed that a legislature could not amend the organic law that
put it into existence.
William M. Meigs of the Philadelphia Bar, in “The Growth of the Constitution,” [See: Vol. 8,
Fed. Stat. Anno. reports Madison's views]:
Madison thought the legislatures clearly incompetent (to ratify the United States Constitution) for the very
changes proposed would make essential inroads on the State Constitution, and a legislature cannot change
the Constitution under which it exists. – 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 243.
On this (and other basis), the Constitution for the United States of America was ratified by
“Conventions of the People” of the States rather than the State legislatures. This raises another
important question: “Were (or are) the State legislatures competent to ratify Amendments to the
Constitution (such as the Fourteenth Amendment) which effectually changed the State
Constitution by the inroads made into it?”
Obviously the Constitutional Convention thought that the State legislatures are incompetent
to ratify any organic law that adversely affected (changed) their State Constitutions. Therefore,
this would appear to give further validity to the proposition that the State legislatures may only
amend the Constitution for the United States of America according to Article V, thereof, when the
purpose of the Amendment is to hold the United States government to the limits of its original
powers. Ratification of any Amendment (which expands power of the United States government
beyond its original limits) must therefore (by any theory) be ratified by “Conventions of the
People” of the class mentioned in the Preamble in their respective States.
NOTE: The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were not ratified by Conventions
of the people and thus those Amendments undermined the States’ Constitutions by
depriving both the governments of the several States and the sovereign people of a great
deal of their powers (by purporting to transfer power to the national government).
It must also be noted:
There is no sounder rule of interpretation (of the Constitution) than that which requires us (the court) to look
at the whole of an instrument, before we (the court) determine a question of construction of any particular
part… – U.S. v. Morris, (1851) 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,815; See also Madison in The Federalist, No. 41 and 8 Fed.
Stat. Anno. 253.
Could this be why there are great efforts being put forth to call a “Constitutional Convention”
for the purpose of giving final validity to these usurpatious “Acts” of American legislators?

Regardless of this fact, it is obvious that the northern usurpation of the Constitution for the
United States of America favoring international [interracial] law was to be protected from
southern resistance by martial law. By Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Congress
would be allowed to decide when the principles of the Preamble were dead and when those who
maintained those principles were also dead (or when they were no longer a threat to these
usurpatious “Acts” against our Constitution).
Considering the weight of the evidence that the Fourteenth Amendment is of martial law
jurisdiction, we can begin to understand why it was thought that Congress might repeal the
disabilities of Section Three without a Constitutional Amendment (outside of the scope of Article
I, Section 8, Clause 18, Constitution for the United States of America).
Over the years, the people have had a great deal of trouble accessing the judicial power of the
courts. Since martial law suspends the judicial power (along with other regular powers of
government), this is quite understandable. Congress’ power is (practically speaking) “unlimited”
where the regulation of courts subjected to martial law rule are concerned. Therefore, why would
Congress think that their power over the martial law measures (in general), is limited to the
Constitution (especially since Congress claimed power under martial law with the power Clauses
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments)?76
A known maxim to the Common Law is that it supersedes the military power. The framers
of our national Constitution understood this principle when they limited Congressional power
to make military appropriations to a maximum term of two years.77 Many Constitutions of the
several States also make this clear by requiring the military power to “bear arms” to remain
subordinate to the civil power.
For example:
The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defense (sic) of themselves, and the State, but the
Military power shall be kept in strict subordination of the civil power. – Oregon Constitution, (1859) Article
I, Section 27.
The second Article in Amendment also makes the subordination of the military power to the
will of the people clear.
Some say we did not adopt the whole of the common law of England. This is true to a certain
extent. We did not adopt the monarchy and the feudal law of England. We did adopt so much
of the common law as was intended by the Framers of the Constitution and those who ratified
it. By the ninth Article in Amendment, it is clear that all rights known to Englishmen were
adopted and were to be retained by the people. In addition, “the people” also assumed unto
themselves the powers of sovereignty (and the rights related thereto) as clearly indicated by the
tenth Article in Amendment to the Federal Constitution. This is the American common-law.
In the Declaration of Rights and Resolves [1774] (as well as the Declaration of Independence
[1776]), some of the men who framed the Constitution complained of the force uses by the King
of England that resulted in the loss of trial by jury and violation of other many rights now known
to be protected by the Bill of Rights. At that time of American history, the King of England was
already using military force (martial law) to govern the Colonies to deprive Americans of their
rights.
Therefore, it cannot be presumed that Congress never had the power to use martial law of
any form to govern within the several States.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT – SECTION FOUR
Next is Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment
of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But
neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. – Fourteenth Amendment, Section
4, United States Constitution.
As previously in this exposé, we will continue to dissect the Fourteenth Amendment with a
view to its legal effects, sentence by sentence, continuing with the remaining portion of Section
Four and going on through Section Five.
The first sentence of Section Four provides:
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment
of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. -
Fourteenth Amendment, Section Four.
For years, several individuals have been questioning the issue and the use of paper money by
the national government. Of course, we know that the main medium which plagues us is the
Federal Reserve Note, but in our zeal to uphold the original intent and purpose of our
Constitution, these individuals have made a fatal error – they have ignored this provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The arguments that have been used against these “Bills of Credit” have always focused on
Article I, Section 8, Constitution for the United States of America. For instance, we know that
Congress is empowered to Coin money, not print it.
The Congress shall have Power . . . To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix
the Standard of Weights and Measures; – Article I, Section 8, Clause 5, Const. for the U.S. of A.
Under this Clause, the Congress fixed the unit of measure for money coined by the United
States at 416 grains of standard Silver (Legal Tender Cases78), calling the unit of measure a
“dollar.” This made the dollar’s Silver a standard by which all other money (”foreign” as well as
“domestic”) would be measured. As a result, there is no such thing as a gold standard in the
United States. Congress has the power to change the weight of a gold dollar without affecting
the standard in Silver. In fact, the Congress is duty bound to change the gold coin when it no
longer reflects a true comparative value to the standard (a dollar’s Silver).
Consequently, legislation can be found (prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment)
changing the amount of gold contained in a gold dollar. Don’t forget that the term: “dollar”
reflects a unit of Silver. When the term: “dollar” is used with respect to gold, it becomes a
comparative term between the value of Gold and Silver (with Silver being the constant and Gold
[in a sense] being given a respective value according to true economic conditions).
The only way that one could avoid being compelled to accept a gold dollar of lessor weight
for the completion of contracts was to make specific reference to the weight of Gold to be
transferred for payment, thus treating the Gold as a “commodity” rather than a monetary unit for
purposes of the specific Contract. [Legal Tender Cases,79].
Although Congress had this power (concerning gold currency), Congress cannot be deemed
to have power to pass legislation which intended to reflect other than the parity between the
standard of measure (dollars silver) and the gold dollar. To do so, would be to deprive those
contracting in gold dollars of property without due process of law in that they could not recover
the true intrinsic value of their Contracts. This would violate the fourth Article in Amendment
by seizing property without warrant or probable cause upon Oath or Affirmation, and would
violate the fifth Article in Amendment by either taking private property for public use without just
compensation or by depriving property without due process of law.
The question is: “Can the Congress issue paper and declare it to have an unrelated value in
gold or silver, or can it issue the same without redemption and force these “Bills of Credit” to
circulate among private Citizens by operation of law?” There is sufficient authority in the original
Constitution to show that Congress was never intended to exercise such a power, or at least, not
to exercise its power in such a way.
In the Constitutional Convention, Sherman (in relation to Article I, Section 10, [Const. for the
U.S. of A.]) said that: “He thought this was a favorable moment for crushing paper money.”80 This
was an extension of the Convention’s “determination to prevent the evils of paper money, already
manifested by striking out from the powers of Congress the power to ‘emit bills on the credit of
the United States’.”81
It should be noted that only the States were directly prohibited from interfering in the
Obligation of Contracts. During the House and Senate debates on H.J.R. 192 of June 5, 1933, this
prohibition was brought into view and it was answered that the prohibition did not apply to the
federal government. While this may be true, the fourth and fifth Articles in Amendment of the
Bill of Rights accomplish the same thing by prohibiting the seizure of property without warrant
or the deprivation of property without due process of law. A man has property in his Contracts
and if the “Obligations of Contract” are interfered with, then that property is deprived of the
parties to the Contract. If this deprivation takes place without proper judicial proceedings
conducted within the limitations of the Bill of Rights, the taking of property is without authority
of law.
When the question of “Bills of Credit” (in relation to the powers of Congress) was raised in the
Convention, the power was offered with the Clause: “to borrow money on the credit of the United
States.” Governor Morris moved to strike out the words “and emit bills on the credit of the
United States.” Madison thought it would be enough to prohibit them from being made a tender.
Ellsworth thought this a favorable moment to bar the door against paper money. Read that the
words (if not struck out) would be “as alarming as the mark of the beast in Revelation.” On this
basis, the words were struck out by nine States to two.82
It is obvious from the Convention (as well as the powers granted to Congress concerning
coinage of money and borrowing of money on the credit of the United States) that no direct or
implied power was given to Congress to force circulation of its evidences of debt as a currency.
While Congress has the power to borrow money on the credit of the United States, the Congress
has no power to force any one to lend to the government (much less the power to spend “debt”
into circulation) without the intention of repayment whatsoever (as in the case of Federal Reserve
Notes ["Promises to pay" are not "payment"]).
As a result of the money (credit) question (raised by the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth
Amendment), we find it necessary to review the Legal Tender Cases. For the most part, those
cases were decided during and after the Civil War Reconstruction period when martial law was
in full bloom in the United States. By looking at these cases in this new light, much can be gained
in the way of understanding the money issue (as well as the Constitution in general).
From the Legal Tender Cases, we first see that the supreme court of the United States initially
declared the legal tender statutes of February 25th, 1862, July 11th, 1862, and March 3rd, 1863,
to be upheld as: “War measures, exceptional in their character, not authorized by any express
grant of the power to Congress contained in the Constitution, but as not prohibited by its terms,
and as justified in view of the great public exigencies which required their adoption.”83 In other
words, paper money was declared legitimate as “martial law money” (an emergency war measure).
The supreme court in Thorington v. Smith,84 (in an Opinion dealing with Judgments of the
Confederate courts [relating to property in dispute in that case]) made a statement that is
applicable to this early decision favoring legal tender laws made during the hostilities of the Civil
War. The court said in Thorington:
But such a judgment, in such a time, has little authority.
Although this was said in relation to Confederate Judgments, the principle still applies. In
times of war (during imposition of martial law), the will to win and martial law may override all
true logic (even down to the principles of the organic law).
It appears that the supreme court held to this principle in the case of Hepburn v. Griswald,85
In Hepburn (supra.), the supreme court reasoned that the exigency which allowed the legal tender
character to be accorded to the Civil War “Greenbacks” was over, thus the conditions which
implied the power (to make them legal tender) had ended. Thus the law could no longer be held
“constitutional” as in the past.
The dissenting Opinion of the Chief Justice in a later legal tender case reports the holding of
the Hepburn court:
The majority of the court as then constituted, five judges to eight, felt obliged to conclude that an act making
mere promises to pay dollars a legal tender in payments of debts previously contracted is not a means
appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated to carry into effect any express power vested in Congress, is
inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution, and is prohibited by the Constitution. – Legal Tender Case,
(1870) 12 Wall. 571, (supra.)

The Opinion of Hepburn was ordered to be published on January 29th, 1870, and was decided
in Conference on November 27th, 1870.
The action of Congress in passage of the first Legal Tender Act was . . . placed distinctly upon the ground of
the existing imperative need of government, and the legal tender clause was urged and adopted as a war
measure. [martial law]. – Julliard v. Greenman, (1884) 110 U.S. 421; 425, 4 S.Ct. 122; 28 L.Ed. 204.
As many of us know, this is not the first time that the government has claimed certain implied
powers as an expedient of war or some other emergency. Martial law measures have consistently
been imposed under the guise of “emergencies” of all kinds (Roosevelt being the greatest offender
since Lincoln). The Hepburn court (without directly overruling its previous judgment upholding
the Legal Tender Acts) merely declared that the exigency no longer existed and that continued
enforcement of the statute must be declared unconstitutional.
After the Hepburn ruling, the United States Attorney General in the cases of Knox v. Lee, and
Parker v. Davis,86 moved to be heard on the Hepburn question (Julliard v. Greenman, [supra.]87).
These cases were heard almost a year after the Hepburn case, with the court reconstituted.
Congress had passed an “Act” allowing for an additional Justice and one of the Justices concurring
in the Hepburn case had retired. These are the conditions under which the question was reheard.
Although the Concurring Justices in the Hepburn case had not changed their Opinion, the legal
tender Clauses were upheld (five Justices to four) thus overturning Hepburn v. Griswald directly.
Many have said this was a packed court, and this may be true. But the court wasn’t packed merely
to overturn Hepburn, rather, it was packed to assure that the recent (and most controversial)
Fourteenth Amendment would be upheld in its entirety. The legal tender question (as we will see)
was merely an incident of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the words of Section Four.
In 1870 (December), the reconstituted court (for the most part) claimed to base its ruling
overturning Hepburn on the grounds laid out in the Dissenting Opinion of the Hepburn case. The
only real difference in the Opinions of the Hepburn court and this later legal tender case (Knox
and Parker ) was that the Dissenting Opinion o 88 f Hepburn became the Concurring Opinion of Knox
and Parker, and the Concurring Opinion of Hepburn became the Dissenting Opinion of Knox and
Parker.
It was noted by the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Field (12 Wall. 634), that the court failed to
give any reason for overturning Hepburn. The question arises, with the turmoil and flat disloyalty
and usurpations involved in adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment still remaining vivid in 1870:
“Did the court dare go to the 4th Section of the Fourteenth Amendment for the additional law it
needed to justify such an upset in the supreme court?” (Note: the Fourteenth Amendment was
never touted as an Amendment that would allow Congress a legal tender power to force paper
money on American Citizens). Justice Field begins his dissent:
Nothing has been heard from counsel in these cases, and nothing from the present majority of the court,
which has created a doubt in the mind of the correctness of the judgment rendered in the case of Hepburn
v. Griswold, or of the conclusions expressed in the opinion of the majority of the court as then constituted.
That judgment was reached only after repeated arguments were heard from able and eminent counsel, and
after every point raised on either side had been the subject of extended deliberation. – Legal Tender Cases,
12 Wall. 634.
Obviously, no one had the courage to directly raise the Fourteenth Amendment in defense of
the legal tender statutes. And in fact, you will not find any direct reference to it in the Arguments
of Counsel or the Majority Opinion of Knox and Parker, (supra.). Had the case turned on this
point, there may have been another Civil War spilling more blood than the last.
While we do not wish to go into great detail about the “Concurring” and “Dissenting Opinions”
in these cases, the court did say some things that we will find important to this discussion.
A study of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly reveals the injustice done by the
Amendment (as well as the injustice done to obtain assent of the States to adopt it).
The court in Knox and Parker admits that Congress, (by its legal tender laws, if declared
unconstitutional) has done a disastrous thing:
Indeed, legal tender treasury notes have become the universal measure of values. If now, by our decision,
it be established that these debts and obligations can be discharged only by gold coin; it, contrary to the
expectations of the parties to these contracts, legal tender notes are rendered unavailable, the government
has become an instrument of the grossest injustice. – Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 530.
By the legal tender law, itself, the government had become the instrument of gross injustice
to the rights of parties who had contracted for specie payments, now the court is worried that
the injustice really done will be revealed. Congress also was worried about this, and that is why
we have a provision in the Fourteenth Amendment disallowing any question of the “validity of the
public debt,” that is, the validity of Congress’ action. If no one can question this action, then how
can the injustice be revealed?
It is further said by the court:
It is incumbent upon those who affirm the unconstitutionality of an act of Congress to show clearly that it is
in violation of the provisions of the Constitution. – Legal Tender Cases 12 Wall. 531.
It must be noted that the litigants against paper money never addressed the validity of the
Fourth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment. No one contested the constitutionality of the
Fourth Section, and while the court alluded to its principles, direct reference to it is avoided like
the plague.
Throughout all the legal tender cases, the Justices in opposition to legal tender present a most
compelling legal argument (as well as historical facts and motives of the framers and the people
of the States as references to show that Congress had no power to enact a legal tender law
making paper acceptable as money [as ruled in Hepburn v. Griswald]).
If looking only at the original organic law (as the Hepburn court did), these arguments are
absolutely valid. But we must remember that we are not dealing only with the original organic
law (and neither was the supreme court after the unconstitutional adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment). The Fourteenth Amendment is claimed to be a part of the organic law, no matter
how false or erroneous that assumption may be. Also, in reviewing these legal tender decisions,
don’t forget that the supreme court is always “on notice” of the Constitution in its entirety,
whether they mention any of its specific provisions or not in their Opinions.
If four supreme court Justices won’t be heeded when relating the true history and meaning
of our original Constitution, where can we expect to prove our point merely on the same grounds
they raised, without dissuading the effect of subsequent (so-called) Amendments. This is exactly
what we have done, but not as well as Justice Field and his fellow dissenting Justices. It seems
like a very futile attempt. All that could be said in the supreme court (about the original
Constitution) in relation to paper money has been said by its own Justices, with one exception;
the relationship that the Fourteenth Amendment bears to the subject and the fact that the
Fourteenth Amendment is a mere fiction, not a part of the Constitution. This question has not
been raised. We must answer the question posed by Justice Field: What allowed Hepburn to be
overturned?
Let us look at some of the things said by the litigants and the court in upholding the legal
tender law. If we are right about the implications of the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, then some reference must have been made to it, even if only indirectly.
You might say that the validity of the public debt has nothing to do with paper currency, or
currency in general. The Attorney General of the United States (in arguing for paper money)
disagrees:
There is a kinship between the borrowing of money and the issuing of a currency made valuable by being
invested with all the facilities of money, in evidence of that borrowing. – Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 526.
Interestingly enough, no reference is made to the Fourteenth Amendment by the Attorney
General when this statement was made (while the language relates directly to provisions of the
Fourth Section).
A decent respect for a co-ordinate branch of government demands that the judiciary should presume, until
the contrary is clearly show, that there has been no transgression of power of Congress . . . – Legal Tender
Cases, 12 Wall 531.
Remember, new power was conferred upon Congress, more plenary in its character than ever
before, with exception of the Thirteenth Amendment (as you will see in our discussion of the Fifth
Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, [infra.]).
In speaking of the powers of Congress:
It is allowable to group together any number of them and infer from them all that the power claimed has
been conferred. – Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 534.
What about the new power of the Fourteenth Amendment? The court admits that the Bill of
Rights was intended to curtail those questionable powers of Congress that may be implied, “these
Amendments are denials of power” (Legal Tender Cases89); and refers to the Preamble of the Bill
of Rights as setting that standard. This will be further discussed with reference to who is
competent to amend the Constitution and under what conditions. But right after the court says
this (for the most part) the Bill of Rights is disregarded. Why does the Fourteenth Amendment
supersede the Bill of Rights where the power exercised is a direct power conferred after their
adoption? Answer: “The limitations of the Bill of Rights are common-law principles, while the
Fourteenth Amendment is martial law.” When “martial law” is put into effect, it is used to
suspend the common law, rightfully or otherwise, and therefore supersedes it.
From the standpoint of constitutional construction:
If there be any conflict between an Amendment and a provision of the original Constitution, the provision
found in the Amendment must control, under the rule that the last expression of the will of the lawmaker
prevails over an earlier one – 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 255.
This also raises the question: “Who is the lawmaker if there is to be a change in the members
of the sovereign body?” Is it not the sovereign body itself, rather than their creations (State
legislatures or Congress)?
It is said that the Congress has power to borrow on the credit of the United States, and the
power to emit “bills of credit” is incident to that power. But the court relates that when the legal
tender laws were passed, it was the fact that the credit of the United States had run out which
caused the exigency (emergency) requiring a legal tender law.
Meanwhile the public treasury was nearly empty, and the credit of the government, if not stretched to its
utmost tension, had become nearly exhausted . . . – Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 541 (Concurring Opinion)
If the credit is exhausted, where is their power to borrow on the credit or any implied power
under it? But, this is not true if the validity of the debt cannot be questioned (Fourteenth
Amendment, Section Four).
The basic reasoning of the concurring court in Knox and Parker90 was that Congress has the
power to declare war and repel insurrection (powers of martial law); from this power is the
implied power to make war or the power to execute such war (implied powers of martial law);
coupled with the war powers (martial law powers) is the power to borrow money on the credit
of the United States; when the credit of the United States runs out or is short, an emergency
exists (an excuse for imposition of martial law measures) and, under the war powers, loans may
be forced. Under this implied power to enforce loans, the government may issue “bills of credit”
evidencing the debt and force their acceptance by declaring them “legal tender.” Here we see an
implication of power not directly given (in its fourth generation of implication) all justified under
the power of “martial law.” This is stretching things to say the least, and we have already
discussed the borrowing power being extinguished when the credit of the United States becomes
none existent. The consequence of a marriage between the war powers and emergency
borrowing when there is no credit to borrow against is legal tender paper money, which would
be better called “martial law money.”
Basically, the power exercised in legal tender was a military power (martial law power) and
when we go back to the Hepburn case, we see that to be true according to the supreme court.
Now with the war over, wherein could the implied martial law powers rest? They had no basis,
this was the decision of Hepburn.
It becomes obvious that Congress needed a new direct grant of power to enforce the legal
tender laws. Thus the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment was purposed to maintain
the validity of the public debt, leaving the Bills of Credit issued as evidence of that debt valid
(under an implied power derived from a new source). Therefore, the Fourth Section of the
Fourteenth Amendment was intended to imply the power to make them (Greenbacks) a legal
tender to maintain the validity of the debt from another source. Nonetheless, the martial law
nature and origin of the debt and its currency (legal tender) cannot be doubted. It is clearly stated
in the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment.
By the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress claims a new direct power as
a basis for implied powers that could not lawfully be used except by necessity of military
exigency. The Fourteenth Amendment is an extension of the Congress’ military (martial law)
power over the entire United States, not confined by any of the Clauses of the original
Constitution for the United States of America (if the Fourteenth Amendment is fact instead of
fiction).

Look at what is alleged to have started the Civil War. Allegedly, a shot was fired on Fort
Sumter. Congress has full power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 to govern Forts, and it could
truly be said that an insurrection had been done against not one of the United States, but against
the property under control of the Congress of the United States. Congress (claiming its martial
law “power to declare war,” “suppress insurrections” and “repel invasions”) imposed martial law
on the United States and never discontinued it. The result was an extension of military and
municipal jurisdiction of Congress. But where is the evidence of this? Look at the Thirteenth
Amendment, the Civil Rights Acts, the Legal Tender Laws, the Fourteenth Amendment, etc., etc.,
etc..
The fact that Congress did not merely extend its coinage power over currency is clearly
admitted by the court:
. . . nor do we assert that Congress may make anything which has no value money. – Legal Tender Cases, 12
Wall. 553. (Concurring Opinion)
Paper “money” isn’t issued under the money powers of Congress, but under the military power
(in conjunction with the borrowing power) and this power is not the original power under the
original Constitution, but a new and different power of martial law rule under the Fourth Section
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The original borrowing power is only solvent when the credit of the United States is intact.
Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers authority beyond that known to the borrowing
power of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 which is obvious since it also relates to the validity of the
public debt and consequently borrowing to create that debt.
In reference to the federal and national characters of the U.S. Government, Justice Bradley says
it is a national power that prevents the States from seceding from the Union.” (Ibid. at 555). When this power
is exercised in prevention of insurrection (as in the Civil War), it is a national power, and any powers implied
by its exigencies are also national powers. In this case, we are clearly talking about the national power of
martial law.
The Fourteenth Amendment is an extension of national military powers presently used in a
municipal character and enforced by municipal laws, stretched far beyond their original
limitations and enforced in Article I Tribunals. See the discussion of Section Five of the
Fourteenth, (infra.) concerning Article I Tribunals.
The court even had the nerve to go to the taxing power of Congress to draw certain
implications about Congress’ power. We know the lawful bounds of the taxing power originally
conferred are “uniformity” and “apportionment.” Ben Franklin referred to paper money as
imposing “a kind of imperceptible tax”. (See “Concurring Opinion” of Justice Bradley, Legal Tender
Cases /91). Without the Fourteenth Amendment, how would such taxation be lawful? Don’t
forget the Fourteenth Amendment is considered the last word on the subjects with which it deals.
In 1884, the case of Julliard v. Greenman 92 again raised the legal tender issue. Up to this
point, no one mentioned the Fourteenth Amendment in legal tender litigation (at least as far as
we have found). Twenty-six years after the Fourteenth Amendment, the Plaintiff in Error in
Julliard v. Greenman finally makes reference to it:
The forced loans of 1862 and 1863, in the form of legal tender notes, were vital forces in the struggle for
national supremacy. They formed a part of the public debt of the United States, the validity of which is
solemnly established by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. – Julliard v. Greenman, 110 US 432.
The Fourteenth Amendment was further alluded to by the Plaintiff in Error:
The question of the constitutionality of an act of Congress, as well as the question of its construction, must
be considered in the light of the history of the time when it was enacted. – Julliard v. Greenman, 110 US 430.
Is this also not true of an Amendment to the Constitution?
And whenever the power sought to be exercised depends, or must be predicated, upon a given state of facts,
the existence of the power is a judicial question to be determined upon the facts. – Ibid.
And, after alluding to cases which support this principle in development of the martial law
jurisdiction (wherein the law of the Fourteenth Amendment lies); he goes on to say:
The same doctrine is maintained in the Slaughter-House Cases.93 – Ibid.
The Slaughter-House cases are adjudications of civil rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and are consistent with the other cases cited by the Plaintiff in Error.
Then at the end of the page 430, the truth really comes out:
The exercise of jurisdiction by a court or a legislature assumes the existence of the jurisdiction in the tribunal
or body exercising it. – Ibid.
What is really being said here? The Fourteenth Amendment has been here, and the Congress
has been allowed to exercise jurisdiction under it for some 26 years, therefore, it must be
assumed to exist. Even the court upheld this jurisdiction in the Slaughter-House cases, there is
no inconsistency here.
It appears that the Plaintiff in Error in Julliard understood exactly what he was talking about,
especially when he says the Fourteenth Amendment makes the public debt unquestionable in the
same argument.
Of course, the Julliard court again gives the same arguments in favor of legal tender notes, (as
had been given in the past). Again, this argument seems to be lacking in something to give it
validity. A close look at the Opinion again reveals the court alluding to the principles of the
Fourteenth Amendment to uphold its position and Justice Field “Dissents” with the same
argument as he, and his like minded Associates had used in the past, still failing to convince the
majority of the court.
These, the arguments of Justice Field (and many more arguments) have been offered against
paper money. Consistently, these arguments have met with little success even when they are
valid arguments under the original Constitution of the United States.
The problem is that Congress has claimed a new power through the Fourteenth Amendment.
We have been missing the point all along. Our attention has been focused upon the original
Constitution and away from those Amendments that are designed to destroy our original concept
of government. By Amendment, it is said: “The validity of the public debt . . . shall not be
questioned”. If no one is allowed to question the public debt, then how can anyone question the
“Notes” representing that debt or the enactments of the legislature forcing us to accept it. We
can not even question Congress’ adoption of the immoral principle of “I’d rather owe you than
cheat you out of it”.
From this we see that the only reason for this Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
(ex post facto) give validity to “Martial Law Acts” (not authorized by the Constitution) and to
prevent the people from contesting those unauthorized “Acts” of martial law.
Why have we not been able to prevent the increase of the national debt? Because, we have
no right to question the validity of the debt in court as long as the Fourteenth Amendment is
considered to be a valid Amendment to the Constitution, (which it isn’t). First, we must attack
the Fourteenth Amendment as “unconstitutional” before any of the otherwise valid arguments
against paper money will have any effect. We have not been making the wrong arguments, we
just haven’t directed them against the perversions of our organic law.
Why do we have the Federal Reserve Corporation? If the Congress is claiming a power to
create an unquestionable public debt, then they will also claim the right to exercise that power
through any agent they wish, especially when that agent simplifies the process of imposing the
debt and increasing it. Congress may claim this power under guise of the “necessary and proper”
Clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, but all of us will know that the power actually lies under
the Fourteenth Amendment, Section Five, “the power to enforce this Amendment by appropriate
legislation.”
The Civil War Congress not only wanted to protect the “Greenbacks” in circulation after the
Civil War, but it wanted to make provision for a new and increasing debt. Notice the words:
“including debts incurred . . . in suppressing insurrection and rebellion . . .”. Had Congress only
intended to protect the “Greenbacks” of the Civil War, these would have been the only debts
protected. Instead, the Congress also included the public debt (in general) allowing the inclusion
of any debt enacted by Congress. If you wish to study the Legal Tender Cases further, here are
some authorities:
• Houston v. Moore, (1820) 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 49; 5 L.Ed. 19.
• Briscoe v. Bank of Commonwealth of Kentucky, (1837)36 U.S (11 Pet.) 257, 9 L.Ed. 709.
• Lick v. Faulkner, (1864) 25 Cal. 405.
• Thorington v. Smith, (1868) 8 Wall.1 (supra.).
• Veazie Bank v. Fenno, (1869) 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533; 19 L.Ed. 482.
• Legal Tender Cases, (1870)12 Wall. 457, (supra.).
• Legal Tender Case, (1884) 110 U.S. 421, (supra.).
It is clear from these cases that the Fourteenth Amendment is a continuation of military power
(martial law) exercised by Congress during the Civil War and that paper money (legal tender) is
martial law money.
As previously stated in this exposé, we will continue to dissect the Fourteenth Amendment,
with a view to its legal effects, sentence by sentence, continuing with the remaining portion of
Section Four and going on through Section Five.
Let us go to the next portion of the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment and see
what relation it has to the first portion and the money issues we have faced.
But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of
insurrection or rebellion against the United States . . .
One of the obvious intentions of these words, was to prevent the southern States from paying
(and their creditors from collecting) debts incurred through participation in the Civil War. Thus,
all those persons who had become the creditors to the southern States were deprived of property
without due process of law. Such a deprivation of property by “Legislative Act” constitutes a “Bill
of Attainder” and in its lesser form, a “Bill of Pains and Penalties.” Congress, as well as the States,
are prohibited from passing such “Acts” in Article I, Sections 9 and 10 of the United States
Constitution. Further more, the “Act” is an “ex post facto law” punishing the act committed with
a law enacted after commission of the act.
This being true, how could power be claimed by Congress to amend the Constitution in this
manner? And how could the State legislatures claim the power to ratify such an Amendment?
This portion of the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment also acts as an
“Indemnification Act” for the United States by making it impossible for any one to lay claims for
the destruction committed by the armies of the United States while enforcing martial law upon
the southern States.
The final portion of the Fourth Section casts light on the money issue previously discussed
as well as the issues of the aforementioned paragraph.
But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay . . . any claim for the loss or emancipation
of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
The enactment of Congress forcing the emancipation of the slaves, was a great loss of
property to those who held them in subjection. The first emancipation of slaves was ordered by
Proclamation of Abraham Lincoln, President, acting as Commander-in-Chief of the military forces
of the United States (and was later claimed to be made perpetual by the Thirteenth Amendment).
By operation of these enactments, property was taken and no compensation was offered and
military force was used to enforce this deprivation of property. “Emancipation” was born out of
martial law and survives under the power of martial law today.
The fourth Article in Amendment makes such an unreasonable seizure of property (seizure of
property without warrant issued upon “Oath” or “Affirmation”) unconstitutional and prohibits
Congress from legislating to this end. Similarly, the Constitutions of the States disable the State
legislatures in the same respect. Neither the Congress nor the State legislatures had power to
pass such legislation, whether in the form of an Amendment or a Statute.

In addition, the fifth Article in Amendment prohibits the taking of property for public use
without compensation and further prohibits the taking of property without due process of law.
“Due process of law” requires a trial by jury in civil cases at common-law (seventh Article in
Amendment) and an indictment and speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the State and
District wherein the crime shall have been committed, and etc., with the right to subpoena
witnesses and face your accusers in criminal cases (sixth Article in Amendment). Clearly, the
members of Congress knew that they could not prevent claims “for the loss or emancipation of
any slaves” from being successful in southern Courts. Also, the members of Congress clearly knew
that southern Juries would uphold claims against the United States as well as the Confederate
States for debts incurred and damages done by the Civil War. Instead of facing this fact, the
members of Congress chose to usurp the law that would be enforced by Juries, that is, the
Common-Law.
Moreover, the States are prohibited from passing any law violating the “Obligation of
Contracts” (Article I, Section 10, Constitution for the United States of America). Every man who
holds property lawfully acquired usually has a “Bill of Sale” evidencing the transfer of ownership
rights. The “Bill of Sale” is an executed Contract, and as such, is one of the few Contracts that has
real standing at law.
The courts of equity may “void” a Contract for “fraud” and other similar conditions; but no one
has any power or right to interfere with valid Contracts and the property rights acquired under
them. If the State can pass no such law, and the Constitution and its Amendments are law; from
whence did the power come for the State legislatures to ratify such an Amendment? Martial Law
is the only answer.
As a result of this Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, litigation arose concerning
confederate currency. The adjudication of these cases is of importance to our understanding of
the issues concerning paper money. The confederate currency bears similarities to the Federal
Reserve Note of today that cannot be ignored.
Many have said that the use of Federal Reserve Notes gives rise to jurisdiction over the
transaction for which they were used. The confederate currency (being designed by the southern
States for all transactions therein [although never made a legal tender]) was considered to be: ”
. . . a currency imposed upon the community by irresistible force.” [Branch v. Haas /94]. In Thorington v. Smith95
the supreme court said:
They have no necessary relations to the hostile government, whether invading or insurgent. They are
transactions in the ordinary course of civil society, and though they may indirectly and remotely promote the
ends of the unlawful government, are without blame, except when proved to have been entered into with
actual intent to further invasion or insurrection.
This is also true of Federal Reserve Notes which are imposed by irresistible force on the
normal course of life and business. Even more so, since the Federal Reserve Notes were declared
“legal tender” from June 5, 1933 (as were their predecessors, the “Greenbacks”).
In the same case, the court said:
We cannot doubt that such contracts should be enforced in the courts of the United States after restoration
of peace, to the extent of their just obligation. – Ibid. See also, 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 237.
Many have contested the obligations of private contracts on the basis of unlawful issuance of
credit or the medium of exchange designated in the Contract. We have (through such Contracts)
obtained “substance” with the credit issued (which indicates that a just obligation arose out of
them). We will find ourselves hard pressed to abrogate such Contracts merely on the basis of
currency designated:
Transaction between individuals, which would be legal and binding under ordinary circumstances, cannot
be pronounced illegal and of no obligation because done in conformity with laws enacted or directions given
by the usurping power. Between these extremes of lawful and unlawful there is a large variety of transactions
to which it is difficult to apply strictly any general rule; but it may be safely said that transactions of the
usurping authority, prejudicial to the interests of citizens of other states excluded by the insurrection and by
the policy of the national government from the care and oversight of their own interests within the states in
rebellion cannot be upheld in the courts of that government.
So, only those transactions which are specifically intended to support the usurping power
would be considered to have any connection with the usurpation. In the meantime, those
transactions (private in nature) only made according to irresistible forces imposed upon the
parties are without blame of the parties and binding to their just value.
The bottom line is – the money issue is a very weak, if not a non-existent argument in relation
to private Contracts. The Constitution applies to governments interaction with the citizen, but
not to citizens interaction with one another. The use of the Federal Reserve Notes (imposed upon
us by irresistible force) does not give rise to blame or attachment to the usurping authority.
Although there may be one exception in the case of “Contracts” adjudicated in State courts.
Under Article I, Section 10, Constitution for the United States of America, “no state shall make any
Thing but gold and silver a tender in payment of debt” and therefore, it is doubtful that the State
courts would have jurisdiction to enforce the Contracts (in the case were “Contracts” make
something other than “gold” or “silver” a tender in payment in debt). Consequently, the State
court could adjudicate the Obligation of the Contract for Federal Reserve Notes, but could not
make a Judgment in that medium. This situation creates an interesting paradox when you
demand that a State court define the medium of exchange in a Judgment on a (so-called) private
Contract written in terms of legal tender.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT – SECTION FIVE
The final section of the Fourteenth Amendment (as reported in the reprints of the United
States Constitution) claims to authorize:
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. -
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5, United States Constitution.
From the words: “of this article” it would appear to have little meaning. But an understanding
of this Section will lead us to a greater understanding of this Amendment’s repugnance to the
original United States Constitution. We will also see its repugnance to the Constitutions of the
several States and the incompetence of the legislative bodies which claimed authority to ratify
it.
We know that this provision is identical to Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment (which
is also of martial law origin). The import of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, while
being similar to Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment in some respects, is much different
in other respects. The reason is that the power Clause of each Amendment (while conducive to
the same end) put different powers into force, and when put into force, they apply to different
objects.
The Thirteenth Amendment was specially designed to operate directly against the Citizen
holding Negroes in subjection. It directly removed property, or property rights, from the hands
of the Citizen mentioned in the Preamble to the United States Constitution. As a result, the
Thirteenth Amendment is construed to operate against individuals (in general) as is legislation
made in pursuance thereof. This is not the case with the Fourteenth Amendment.
We must not forget that the province and scope of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments are different;
the former simply abolished slavery; the latter prohibited the status from abridging the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; from depriving them of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, and from denying to any the equal protection of the laws. The amendments are different, and
the powers of Congress under them are different. What Congress has power to do under one, it may not have
power to do under the other. Under the Thirteenth Amendment, it has only to do with slavery and its
incidents. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, it has power to counteract and render nugatory all state laws
and proceedings which have the effect to abridge any of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States, or to deprive them of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny any of them the
equal protection of the laws. Under the Thirteenth Amendment, the legislature, so far as necessary or proper
to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery and involuntary servitude, may be direct and primary,
operating upon the acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by state legislation or not; under the Fourteenth,
as we have already shown, it must necessarily be, and can only be, corrective in its character, addressed to
counteract and afford relief against state regulations or proceedings. – Civil Rights Cases, (1883) 109 U.S. 3,
23; 3 S.Ct. 18; 27 L.Ed. 835.
The Fourteenth Amendment operates against the States as a whole, that is, either against the
different branches of state government, or the people (sovereign body) of each State, as a whole,
when acting in their sovereign or legislative political capacity to create or enforce State law.
Considering that Congress’ powers are enumerated in Article I, Section 8, Constitution for the
United States of America, it is reasonable to assume that Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment is intended to give Congress new powers or to extend some existing power beyond
the limits established by the original Constitution. In reference to the Fourteenth Amendment,
the supreme court said:
. . . It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged. . . . – Ex Parte, Virginia, (1879) 100 US 339, 344;
25 L.Ed. 676; 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 634.
Not only did the supreme court say that Congress’ power was enlarged, the supreme court
also made it clear that it was only Congress’ power that was enlarged and not that of the general
government.
All of the amendments derive much of their force from this latter provision. It is not said that the judicial
power of the general government shall extend to enforce the prohibitions and to protecting the rights and
immunities guaranteed. – Ex Parte, Virginia, (1879) 100 US 339, 344; 25 L.Ed. 676; Stat. Anno. 634.
This raises a peculiar question in relation to this claimed expansion of power on the part of
Congress. If the judicial power is not expanded by this provision, then, is a court (upon whom
Congress confers jurisdiction) exercising “judicial power” or the power of the Congress when
adjudicating Civil Rights cases? Any “so-called” court that enforces legislation under an
Amendment with this (or a similar power Clause) is proceeding as an Article I legislative Tribunal
of Congress, not as an Article III Judicial Court of the Constitution.
We know from the Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 7441 that the U.S. Tax Court is what is known
as an Article I (legislative) Court (tribunal).
There is hereby established, under Article I of the Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be
known as the United States Tax Court. The members of the Tax Court shall be the chief judge and the judges
of the Tax Court. – 26 U.S.C. 7441
We also know that an Article III court, that is, a court that actually exercises the judicial
powers vested by Article III, can be created by Congress and vested with purely judicial power.
Here we see that Congress exercises the power to create two different kinds of courts,
however, only one is vested with the judicial powers known to Article III of the U.S. Constitution.
How do these courts differ? And what power does an Article I Court depend upon or exercise?
Once Congress has created an Article III court (and vested it with specific jurisdiction), it
becomes independent of Congress. Its judges have perpetual term of office as long as they are
in good behavior (Article III, Section 1) and its Judges may only be removed from office by
impeachment (Article II, Section 4). The Judges of an Article III court may not have their
compensation diminished during their term of office (Article III, Section 1). It is only the courts
with these attributes which actually can exercise the judicial power of Article III of the U.S.
Constitution and it is only these courts which can truly operate within the doctrine of separation
of powers, a doctrine indispensable to our republican form of government. [Northern Pipe v.
Marathon Pipe96].
Since the Officers of an Article III court may act without retribution for their actions, the court
has both the power and the duty to lay statutory law next to the Constitution and see if the latter
squares with the former, and if the statutory law does not conform to the Constitution it must
be declared “null” and “void.” [Marbury v. Madison97]. This being the attributes of an Article III
court, the same must have been created by the power granted in Article III.
The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in … such inferior courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish. – Article III, Section 1, Const. for U.S. of A.
The words of this Clause give the courts thereunder the attribute of permanence by the words
“ordained and established”, that is, these courts have a fixed character and they are as perpetual
as the Union itself.
How does an Article I court differ in character when compared to an Article III court? And
does an Article I court exercise the lawful judicial power of the United States?
Article I contains another reference to Congress’ power concerning what appear to be courts:
The Congress shall have power . . . to constitute Tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; – Article I, Section
8, Clause 9, Const. for U.S. of A.
Notice the difference in wording between the Clause of Article I and the Clause of Article III.
The latter makes reference to “courts” (inferior) to the “supreme court” while the former refers to
“Tribunals” inferior to the “Supreme Court.” Article III lays certain requirements on tenure of
office, etc., while Article I lays no such requirements. So, in Article I we see the raw power of
Congress (without respect to the limitations the Constitution) places upon the Article III judicial
powers. When that power (judicial power) is exercised within the confines of Article III, it is said
that the court created is a judicial body exercising a power separate from the legislature (which
is the judicial power conferred and limited by Article III). It should be noted that as Article I
makes reference to “Tribunals” inferior to the Supreme Court, the “Supreme Court” of Article I
must also be a “Tribunal” and thus is not the same “supreme court” of that in Article III.
It is interesting to note that the Federal Statutes Annotated, Volume 8, p. 633 (in discussing
Article I, Section 8, Clause 9) only makes mention of Congress’ power under Article I being used
within the confines of Article III, that is, up to 1864. Yet, today, we have Tribunals known as
Article I courts. It would seem logical then to deduce that in 1864 (or some time thereafter)
Congress’ power was extended in such a manner as to allow Tribunals to be created by the raw
power of Congress without Article III limitations (and without the necessity of Article III
altogether). The Fourteenth Amendment was allegedly ratified on July 9, 1868. In 1879, the
supreme court ruled that only Congress’ power was extended by the Amendment (14th).
In relation to the Tax Court, Congress was allegedly vested with extended power in the area
of taxation (Sixteenth Amendment), and consequently we have an Article I court with relation to
the tax imposed under that Amendment.
Another point must be looked at in reference to these questions. Congress has exclusive
legislative power over the District of Columbia:

The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District
(not exceeding ten Miles square) as may . . . become the Seat of the Government of the United States . . . -
Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, Const. for U.S. of A.
But this is not the power that is exercised by Congress under Martial Law Rule of the Civil War
Amendments
Congress also claims the power to legislate, in certain cases, by implication of powers
specifically granted:
The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper in Execution of the
foregoing power, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States,
or in any Department or Officer thereof. – Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, Const. for U.S. of A.
This also is not the power exercised by Congress under the martial law rule of the Civil War
Amendments. This Clause requires legislation to be both “necessary” and “proper.” The wording
of Article I, Section 8, Clause 18 (requiring Congress legislation to be “proper”) leaves it in the
hands of the judicial power to determine whether Congress action is “constitutional.” On the
other hand, the wording of the power Clauses of the Civil War Amendments (requiring
“appropriate” legislation to enforce the Amendments) leaves it in the hands of Congress to
determine what legislation is “appropriate” as a political consideration. Consequently, the courts
of judicial power are prevented from determining the constitutionality of Congress’ action under
these power Clauses because judicial Courts have always claimed they cannot decide political
questions without violating the separation of powers. Therefore, without challenging validity of
the entire Amendment, we cannot challenge the Constitutional validity of any “Act” of Congress
under the Amendment having this type of power Clause.
Taking all this into consideration (along with the alleged extension of solely Congressional
power authorized by Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment) it could only be deduced that
an Article I court, (created under this power) exercises legislative rather than judicial power.
Remember, the power of the judiciary was not extended by Section Five.
If an Article I court exercises only legislative power, then these courts apparently do not have
the power (as does the Article III court) to lay a legislative enactment next to the Constitution and
declare its validity or invalidity. This is the design of the Civil War Amendments and any other
Amendment with a similar power Clause. Being in exercise of merely legislative power, the Article
I court (tribunal) must follow the dictates of the legislature (Congress) and no other, because it
is merely an extension of the legislature.
How many times have you heard of Tax Court cases when the Tax Court has said either, the
Constitution is inapplicable, or that a claim of Constitutional limitations is frivolous? This alone
supports the aforementioned proposition.
This indicates, in the area of the Thirteenth (and subsequent Amendments), that all power
exercised under them is “legislative” and any body that exercises powers similar to those of
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, are merely extensions of the legislature.
Now we see why the supreme court refers to the power Clause as an enlargement of power
rather than a creation of new power. It is an enlargement because the extension of martial power
is used in conjunction with previous powers initially conferred upon Congress.
Going back to Congress’ power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 18; look at what the
government’s own Publication says in relation to the judiciary in the District of Columbia.
In the District of Columbia there is no division of powers between the general and local government.
Congress has the entire control over the District for every purpose of government, and in organizing a judicial
department, all judicial power necessary for the purpose of the government may be vested in the courts of
justice of the District. – 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 659.
All judicial power? This conveys the fact the Congress may create courts in the District of
Columbia under authority of Article I without reference to Article III (or any other provision of the
original Constitution). So called Article I courts are “Tribunals.”
Congress has followed a similar scheme in the case of national Article I Tribunals and in the
case of vesting Article III courts with the power of Article I Tribunals. This is why there has been
some confusion. Some people believe the Congress has expanded its jurisdiction over the District
of Columbia and its territories beyond the limitations of the Constitution into the several States.
But this is in error. Congress has expanded its jurisdiction through the power of Martial Law and
created a whole new venue, a regional venue. This is what “regionalism” is all about:
The general restrictions of the Constitution which govern the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of the
United States within the several states of the Union have no operation in the District of Columbia, and the
conditions of jurisdiction existing in the District make the provisions of section 1 of the Act of 1887, defining
the jurisdiction of the circuit courts in districts within the several states, plainly inapplicable. General
provisions of an Act of Congress not locally applicable are controlling under the provisions of Sec. 93, Rev.
Stat. D.C. – Gilford Granite Co. v. Harrison Granite Co., 23 App. Cas. (DC) 22 (1903).
Under the authority of Congress to make “municipal law” for the District of Columbia,
Congress need not hold to the Constitution (as it must with respect to the several States) nor (it
appears) even to the doctrine of “separation of powers” (which is inapplicable in the District of
Columbia). A similar scheme is followed in the case of Martial Law “regionalism” (again creating
the aforesaid confusion), the difference being that judicial courts are prevented from questioning
the “Acts” of Congress under Martial Rule while in the District of Columbia (the judicial courts had
the power to determine whether Congress had exceeded the limits of authority related to the
District of Columbia).
We know that the Fourteenth Amendment interferes with the sovereignty the several States
retained prior to its alleged ratification. If this was a mere expansion of municipal power of the
District of Columbia, the judicial courts would be able to adjudicate the constitutionality of the
expansion of venue and jurisdiction. But this is not the case. The Fourteenth Amendment places
prohibitions upon the States that never existed before (without reference to the District of
Columbia or other territory of the United States) which said prohibitions encroach upon State
sovereignty:
The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the states and they are to a degree restrictions
of state power. – 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 631.
Congress’ power allegedly was extended into State sovereignty. Was Congress’ municipal
authority over the District of Columbia extended into the several States to create Article I courts
in the States to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment? The power exercised is purely “legislative,”
not judicial, but it is not the power over the District of Columbia, it is national martial law power,
(not limited by Constitutional provisions related to the District of Columbia or other territory
appertaining to the United States).
It’s unquestionable that Congress conferred jurisdiction on the courts of the United States to
hear Civil Rights cases. The power exercised (being purely Congressional) by any court which
exercises jurisdiction pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, acts as an Article I Tribunal. You
might say: “But Article III courts were vested with this (civil rights) jurisdiction.” That may be true,
but when an Article III court exercises “legislative power,” it must act as a legislative Tribunal and
is reduced to an Article I Tribunal for the adjudication of such cases.
Either the Tribunal exercises the power of the legislature or it exercises the power of the
judiciary as a court. The body (tribunal or court) cannot exercise both “legislative” and “judicial
powers” simultaneously under the original Constitution and since only the power of Congress is
allegedly enlarged by Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, a “Tribunal” cannot exercise
both powers under this Clause either.
Who can claim these Fourteenth Amendment protections and through whom is this national
martial law power of Congress extended into the several States?
Until some state law has been passed, or some state action through its officers or agents has been taken,
adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the
United States under said amendment, nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity;
… the amendment was intended to provide against … state laws or state action of some kind, adverse to the
rights of the citizen secured by the amendment. – Civil Rights Cases, (1883) 109 U.S. 3, 13, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed.
835; 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 631.
“Non-whites” are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, Congress found these
“persons” a fit instrument for spreading their Martial Law jurisdiction throughout the several
States. The unfortunate part of this “for persons of color” is that they have been led to believe
they are allowed to access the judicial power of the United States when the truth is that they have
only been allowed to access the arbitrary power of Congress under the Civil War Amendments.
This is why “persons of color” in the United States continue to feel that they have no rights,
because they have no independent judicial power to protect them.
Thus, Congress legislates between two or more races. A nation is a race or vice versa (Title:
“Nation”, Webster’s Dictionary [1828]). Congress’ legislation then is based on principles of
“international law,” and therefore is a form of international law for all intents and purposes.
“Martial law” and “international law” work well together for Congressional purposes because they
do not respect the authority of the Common-Law.
The exercise of Martial Law jurisdiction within the several States, is the usurpation of the
Common Law and subjects the sovereign body (white Citizenry) to a jurisdiction that has no right
to exist within the States.
Furthermore, since the Amendment (14th) only can invoke Congress’ power (when involving
those intended to be protected thereby, such as the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments),
white Citizens have no rights to sue under this Amendment.
There is, of course, one exception to this rule. If a white Citizen acquires the same legal
status (artificial character) as those protected by the Amendment (through the operation of some
statutory law of Congress), then said white Citizen may be brought within the venue of the
Amendment as a statutory (juristic) person. By this means, white Citizens birthrights become of
no affect and their rights are reduced to the inferior character of statutory Civil Rights (mere
legislative privileges).
It must be remembered that the white Citizen obtaining this status will also be “subject to the
jurisdiction thereof” (of the United States Congress) and can legally be regulated by the laws
Congress passed under its Martial Law authority. Here the extension of municipal laws of
Congress outside the boundaries set by the U.S. Constitution is complete. By this contrivance
(and others emanating from the Fourteenth Amendment), the States have been reduced to mere
administrative arms and provisional appendages of Congress and Congress’ power has been
extended to include the entirety of the United States.
The difference between the white man holding citizenship intact according to the Preamble
of the United States Constitution (and all others who claim protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment), is the difference between a natural birthright known to the Common-Law (or
privilege, or immunity, guaranteed by the original Constitution) and a “so called” right, privilege,
or immunity, created by the Constitution and Statute (a privilege or immunity that never before
existed for the party upon whom it was conferred by statute). The supreme court has recognized
that Congress may protect both:
A right or an immunity, whether created by the Constitution or only guaranteed by it, even without an express
delegation of power, may be protected by Congress. – Strauder v. West Virginia, (1879) 100 US 303, 310, 25
L.Ed. 664 reversing State v. Strauder, (1877) 11 W.Va. 745.
But we would venture to say that a Citizen will find more protection in a “natural right” than
a “privilege” conferred by Congress. The institution of government was inherently for the
protection of natural rights (Preamble – U.S. Const.), while the granting of a privilege is merely at
the tolerance of the sovereign body that created government and at the tolerance of the
government the sovereign body created. The main point is, the courts have recognized that there
are both “natural rights” and those “so called” rights artificially created by law (privileges).
In fact, State common law (natural rights) seem to receive no protection. It should also be
noted that where a State government has agreed to usurp its sovereign body (free white State
Citizens) and show itself disloyal to them by passing legislation in conformance with the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress’ power is extinguished. In this relation, the U.S. supreme court
said:
When the state has been guilty of no violation of its provisions; when it has not made or enforced any law
abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; when no one of its departments has
deprived any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denied to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; when on the contrary, the laws of the state, are enacted by
its legislative, and construed by its judicial, and administered by its executive departments recognize and
protect the rights of all persons, the amendment imposes no duty and confers no power upon Congress. – U.S.
v. Harris, (1882) 106 U.S. 629, 632, 1 S.Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290.
In other words, when State martial law is imposed within the State to enforce National martial
law, Congress has no reason to exercise its martial law powers.
If a State has conformed to the new Order, there is no need for Congress to intervene. And
if a white Citizen has not obtained the standing of a former slave by petitioning Congress for
admittance to venue and jurisdiction of the Fourteenth Amendment (i.e. statutory character of
“person”), then Congress has no power over that individual under this Clause (Amend. 14, Sec.
5).98
With all that has been said about the Fourteenth Amendment in this exposé, the ultimate
question remains: “Is the Fourteenth Amendment a part of the United States?” Or, rather, “Is it
constitutionally a part of our organic law?”
The original Resolution which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to the several States
legislatures for ratification contained a Clause which does not appear in the reprints of the United
States Constitution:
Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, (two thirds of both Houses concurring). That the following Article be proposed to the legislatures
of the several States as an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three
fourths of said legislatures, shall be valid as a part of the Constitution, namely: – Article XIV . . . – 14 Stat. 358
(1866).
In looking into the Constitutionality of this Amendment (14th), we must look to see who
proposed it; who ratified it; and if the power was actually vested in those bodies by the people
of the United States of America in national Constitution to lawfully do so.

From the foregoing Preamble to the Resolution proposing the Fourteenth Amendment, we
can see that Congress proposed it, and it was intended that the several States legislatures would
ratify it.
There is a great deal of recorded history that shows the unscrupulous way in which the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was achieved. The basic disloyalties, the martial law,
and political usurpations that took place after the Civil War are revealed by history to be:
• Military occupation of the several southern States under declaration by Congress, that the
southern State governments were not valid, even though they had just been allowed to
ratify the Thirteenth Amendment;
• Franchisement of non-citizens (basically Negroes) into the body politic;
• Disfranchisement of white Citizens (members of the sovereignty) from the body politic;
Institution, through a military government, of predominantly Negro legislatures (while
Negroes were not citizens); and
• The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by these non-citizen legislatures in the
southern States, after the lawful legislatures (which existed prior to military occupation)
had rejected this same Amendment.
There are no doubts that these are the historical facts. Let us now take a look at the legal side
of the question.
We know several things about the Fourteenth Amendment in relation to Congress and the
prohibitions laid against Congress by the original Constitution for the United States of America,
(including the Bill of Rights). We know what the Amendment was designed to do and that it does
the following things:
• It violates the Preamble, which defines the whole intent of all powers granted to Congress,
by introducing a foreign member into the sovereign body.
• It is an “ex post facto law” punishing Southerners in many ways for acts not necessarily
illegal at the time of their commission.
• It is a “bill of attainder” (in its lesser form of a “bill of pains and penalties”) depriving all
southern slave holders of property without trial.
• It deprived Southerners of property by unreasonable seizure and without just
compensation, bringing Congress beyond limitations set out by the Fourth and Fifth
Articles in Amendment (Bill of Rights).
• It lays prohibitions upon the States beyond those known to the original Constitution of
the United States and makes inroads upon the Constitutions of the several States,
encroaching upon sovereignty belonging to the people of the several States which is
prohibited by the Tenth Article in Amendment (Bill of Rights).
• It created purely legislative “Tribunals” without respect to the separation of powers.
• It extended Congress’ “martial law power” allowing the emission of “bills of credit” and
etc..
• The list is too long to completely enumerate. (Refer back within this exposé to list more
Constitutional violations)
We know that the United States government is one of enumerated powers only, and that
specific prohibitions were placed on those powers by Article I, Section 9 and the Articles of the
Bill of Rights (as well as other provisions of the United States Constitution).
Of course, the main points we are interested in are the prohibitions laid on Congress.
Congress has no power to pass any “bill of attainder” or “ex post facto law” to make law which
unreasonably deprives a Citizen of “property” or deprives the Citizen of “security in his person or
effects;” to encroach upon a State’s sovereignty retained at the adoption of the United States
Constitution, or to make any law taking property for public use without just compensation.
The fact is, Congress exceeded the powers granted to it and violated prohibitions laid against
it (in several areas) and had absolutely no right, power, or authority to propose such legislation
and could only claim an exception through a similarly unlawful Act, the Second Section of the
Thirteenth Amendment. Thus we find that we will have to show the Thirteenth Amendment to
be invalid and unconstitutional, and in fact, not a part of the Constitution in order to judicially
destroy the Fourteenth Amendment (at least with respect to the power of Congress as regards
the proposing the Fourteenth Amendment).
But now let us take into consideration who actually claimed the power to ratify the
Fourteenth Amendment, the State legislatures. We know everyone in government claims the
Fourteenth Amendment is a part of the Constitution because it was ratified according to the
provisions of Article V of the original U.S. Constitution which says that three fourths of the
legislatures may ratify an Amendment to the Constitution and thus make the Amendment part of
the organic law, but can the legislatures of the several States constitutionally make ratifications
in all instances?
According to the principles upon which our form of government is founded and considering
who originally ratified the Constitution, the answer to this question must be in the “negative” as
a matter of law. We start to see the evidence in the law immediately with Article V of the
Constitution for the United States of America.
. . . Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight
shall in any manner effect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. – Article V, Const. for U.S. of
A..
Here we see two specific exceptions to the law of Amendment contained in Article V. Many
times, the courts have ruled that when specific exemption is provided in the Constitution, that
none other exists. In this case, that construction will not properly apply, especially since those
exceptions applied both to the State legislature and Conventions of People of the several States.
When the construction of the Constitution is doubtful or the language ambiguous, resort may
be made to other portions of the Constitution and finally to the “Convention Notes” and the
“Federalist Papers.” Article V contains two methods of amending the Constitution;
. . . by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as
the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress: . . . – Article V, Const. for U.S.
of A.
Why were the two modes of ratification provided for? Is it possible that cases might arise
where it was absolutely necessary for Conventions of the several States to ratify an Amendment
instead of the several State legislatures? And if an Amendment required ratification by
Conventions of the people of the several States, could Congress expect a lawful and constitutional
ratification from the legislatures of the several States? Furthermore, even if Congress could
recommend either mode of ratification, could the State legislatures lawfully and constitutionally
make this ratification when it affected the Constitution of the State which created them? These
are valid and important questions which must be answered as a matter of, and according to law,
(in relation to Article V and the two modes of ratification). These questions consequently leave
the language of Article V in somewhat of an ambiguous state.
To find the answer to these important questions, we will start at the beginning, the creation
of our government. Justice Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford99 relates the history of the beginning
of our government and the meaning of the Preamble to the United States Constitution. Therein
we find (as we do in the words of the Preamble) that the sovereign people (”We the People”)
adopted [ratified] the Constitution and it was on their authority (as the sovereign bodies, in their
respective States) that the General Government was formed (and that it was formed for their
protection, as well as the protection of their posterity).
Some might say that the Constitution for the United States of America could as easily have
been ratified by the legislatures of the several States; but if this is true, why does history (as well
as the Constitution) reflect that it was ratified by the people in Conventions of the several States
instead?100 The fact is, the legislatures of the several States had no lawful authority to ratify the
United States Constitution. The Convention related the legal reason why the Constitution had
to be ratified by the people instead of the legislatures. The following remarks were made with
reference to Article VII, Constitution for the United States of America.
. . . Madison thought them essential and remarked that otherwise in cases of conflicts between laws of the
States and of Congress, the courts of the former might decide in favor of their own laws; and he remarked
further that it might be asserted that the Union was a mere treaty among independent States, and therefore
a breach of any one article absolved the other parties from the whole obligation, – 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 243.
Here, Madison thought the peoples ratification necessary to the supremacy Clause of Article
VI. Knowing this, (contrary to the ruling of the supreme court of the United States in Neal v.
Delaware101), the supremacy Clause of the national Constitution could not be applied the
Amendments which made inroads into the Constitutions of the several States (and which were
only ratified by State legislatures).
Question: “Is this why the several States have been coerced to amend their own Constitutions
consistent with national martial law Amendments?”
Question: “Is this why the provisional States, such as the provisional State of Washington,
were induced into placing a provision in the (so-called) State Constitution making the United
States Constitution the Supreme Law of the Land?” [Washington Constitution (1889), Article I,
Section 2.]
If the State Constitutions declare the national Constitution “supreme,” then the supremacy
Clause of the national Constitution will not come into play in adjudication’s concerning the Civil
War Amendments (and like Amendments).
If the State Constitutions adopt the provisions that are consistent with the Civil War
Amendments (and like Amendments) then, again, the application of supremacy Clause of the
national Constitution will not be questioned concerning conflicts of law between the States and
the United States, because there will be no conflict of law.
Later in the Convention:
Governour Morris argued that, as no alteration could be made under the Confederation without unanimous
consent, and change in the proposed Constitution not made in accordance with this provision, must be held
void by the judges as unconstitutional, if the reference would be made to the legislatures; while, if the
reference should be made to the people of the United States, the federal compact may be altered by a
majority of them. – 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 243.
Morris understood that the people were sovereign above the several State legislatures.
Finally, Madison made the most important legal argument showing that the States legislatures
were incompetent to ratify the Constitution for the United States of America and this argument
still applies today.
Madison thought the legislatures clearly incompetent, for the very changes proposed would make essential
inroads on the State Constitutions, and a legislature cannot change the Constitution under which it exists.
The difference between a system founded on the legislature only and one founded on the people is, he said,
that between a league or treaty and a Constitution. – 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 243, 244.
While all the other Conventioneers arguments related to the Articles of Confederation,
Madison was capable of showing the absolute legal incompetence of the State legislatures to
ratify the national Constitution. If a State legislature allows inroads to be made upon the
Constitution under which it exists (by ratification of a national Constitution, much less an
Amendment thereto), it is Constitutionally incompetent to pass upon the legislation. This is
consistent with the principles of a Constitutional Republic where the institutions of government
cannot change the organic law of the people under which the government legally exists. Only the
sovereign body (the people) can act upon such legislation because it is “organic law”
(extraordinary legislation), not mere ordinary legislation.
We have seen the inroads that the Fourteenth Amendment made on the Constitutions of the
several States, whether they were southern or northern. With the possible exception of one or
two States, this Amendment (14th) made inroads into all State Constitutions under which the
State legislatures existed when they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. Here, the reason for
two methods of ratification comes to light in the first instance:
It may be said that the “Notes” on the Convention are not a reliable source of construction of
the Constitution. And in certain cases, this may be true. But not here! The supreme court (as
in Dred Scott v. Sandford,102 [supra.]) has said that legislation most recent to the adoption of the
Constitution lays closest to the foundation of the organic law and must be accorded the necessary
respect due according to the era of their enactment. Obviously, this is true (considering that such
legislation is contemporary to the organic law), that is, it is contemporary to a time when the
original intent was foremost in the minds of the Officials of government, both State and Federal.
Article V had at least one primary purpose in the Constitution. In the Convention it was
agreed that a provision should be made in the Constitution so that the several States might add
a Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution as a condition of its adoption.
Pursuant to this proposition of the Convention (and with the understanding that a Bill of
Rights could be added), Conventions of the People of the several States ratified the Constitution
and proceeded to propose Articles of the Bill of Rights to be added accordingly.
In the Preamble to the Bill of Rights (seldom found reprinted in any Constitution, whether
printed by the federal government or private parties), we find the first impression of the several
States, as to the purpose of Article V, Constitution for the United States of America.
The Bill of Rights was ratified by the legislatures of the several States; and of this there is no
doubt. Obviously, both Congress and the several States legislatures believed they had the power
to make the ratification. When we look at the Preamble to the Bill of Rights, we see under what
circumstance the power was believed to exist:
THE Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their adopting the Constitution, expressed
a desire, in order to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declarative and restrictive
clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of public confidence in the Government will best
insure the beneficent ends of its institution.
RESOLVED by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, two thirds of the Houses, that the following Articles be proposed to the Legislatures of the several
States as Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, all or any of which Articles when ratified by
three fourths of the said Legislatures, to be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the said Constitution.
vis!
ARTICLES in addition to, and Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, proposed by
Congress, and ratified by the Legislatures of the several States, pursuant to the fifth Article of the original
Constitution. – Preamble to the Bill of Rights, U.S. Constitution.

So the Bill of Rights (as ratified by the State legislatures) was ratified with the intention of
limiting the federal government to the power granted to it, for the preservation of the powers
of the several States and the individual Citizen’s natural rights. Here, the legislatures of the
several States did not attempt to expand the powers of Congress (by inroads into their own
respective Constitutions), but, instead, ratified the added assurance that Congress would not
usurp its powers in deprivation of the powers of the several States or the people of the several
States respectively. [Articles Nine and Ten in Amendment].
If we read Hans v. Louisiana,103 we find that the State legislatures again ratified an Amendment
of the United States Constitution with the same purpose, that is the Eleventh Amendment. Not
until the Thirteenth Amendment were the powers of Congress so widely expanded, or for that
matter, expanded at all by an alleged Amendment to the Constitution. Going back to the
assertions of Madison in the Convention; “Where did the legislatures of the several States derive
power to ratify any Amendment which made inroads into the Constitution under which they
existed?” The power, in itself, would be “nugatory.”
Obviously, Article V provides for ratification of an Amendment by Conventions of the People
of the several States for occasions such as this. In fact, the principles upon which the federal
Constitution was founded absolutely demand that such Amendments be ratified by the people
rather than the State legislatures. No legislative body has the power to change the organic law
and its relation to the sovereign body (Nation) that created it. Only the sovereign people,
themselves, have the power to add to its members a new class of persons.
As a result, we see that no competent body purposed nor ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
(or any like Amendment affecting the sovereign body), that said Amendment is not a part of the
Constitution for the United States of America, and that the Amendment (and like Amendments)
are absolutely unconstitutional in this respect. They are not Amendments of our Constitution.
Not only do the Amendments discussed herein (such as the Fourteenth Amendment) make
inroads into State Constitutions (especially where the States have a Bill of Rights similar to that
of the Constitution for the United States of America), but the several State legislatures are also
prohibited by “the people” in the Constitution for the United States of America, itself, from
enacting (ratifying) such legislation into law.
Article I, Section 10, Constitution for the United States of America, lays prohibitions on the
several States (similar to those laid against the United States government in Article I, Section 9,
Constitution for the United States of America) with one further prohibition; the several States
have no power to violate the “Obligations of Contract” by laws enacted in the State. As we
previously discussed, many “bills of sale” (executed Contracts) that were violated by the Thirteenth
Amendment were sanctioned to be violated by adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Not only are the State legislatures prohibited by their own respective State Constitutions from
passing such legislation, but they are also prohibited by the Constitution for the United States
of America from passing such legislation into law, Organic or otherwise. We find no repeal of
those original prohibitions at any time before or after the alleged adoption of the Thirteenth or
Fourteenth Amendments.
The bottom line is that the State legislatures were, and are, incompetent to ratify the
Fourteenth Amendment for no power of ratification having existed in the bodies to whom it was
presented.
Another point to address is the 14th Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of
America is not an “Amendment,” it is a “Revision.”
Case law is evidently unanimous in support of the view that there is a distinction of substance
between the concept of “Amendment” and “Revision” and that some proposed constitutional
changes can only be accomplished by revision. The 104 line between changes which are permissible
as “Amendments” and those which must necessarily be “Revisions” cannot be drawn with
precision. In general, changes which are “few and simple and independent” can be considered
Amendments, whereas “sweeping change” requires the Revision process.105 The case of McFadden
is instructive on the distinction between “Amendment” and “Revision.” Quoting from an earlier
case, the McFadden court discussed revisions made by a Convention in which “the entire
sovereignty of the people is represented . . .” Id. at 789.
The character and extent of a constitution that may be framed by that body is freed from an limitations other
than those contained in the constitution of the United States. . . the very term ‘constitution’ implies an
instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicated
the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety
of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of
the term ‘amendment’ implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will
effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.106 – McFadden v. Jordan, 196
P.2d 787, 789
The court held that the measure in question was so “far reaching and multifarious” that it was
revisory rather than amendatory in nature.107 The court listed numerous sections of the
Constitution which the measure in question would affect.108 This review demonstrated:
. . . the wide and diverse range of subject matters proposed to be voted upon, and the revisional effect which
it would necessarily have on our basic plan of government. The proposal is offered as a single amendment
but it obviously is multifarious. It does not give the people an opportunity to express approval or disapproval
severally as to each major change suggested. . . . – McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 796-97
In Adams v. Gunter, 109 the court opined that amendment as distinct from revision authority
includes only the power to amend any section in such a manner that such Amendment, if approved, would be
complete within itself, relate to one subject and not substantially affect any other section of Articles of the
Constitution or require further Amendments to the Constitution to accomplish its purpose.110
The above authorities quoted merely suggest factors that should be considered in determining
whether a proposed constitutional change is “amendatory” or “revisory.” The 14th Amendment
addresses multifarious issues ranging from status of citizenship, disqualification of
representatives, taxes, apportionment of representatives, and the debt of the United States. And
taking into consideration what we have studied, the 14th Amendment has altered more than one
Article of the Constitution for the United States of America.
The bottom line is that Congress was and is incompetent to make “Revisions” to the
Constitution for the United States of America, that the 14th Amendment is absolutely
unconstitutional and therefore “null and void” ab initio for no power of “Revision” exist in the
Congress.
We cannot emphasize enough that, as a matter of law, there is no Fourteenth Amendment to
the Constitution for the United States and that even if there were, it would have absolutely no
lawful application to the individual free white Citizens of the several States.
The Law Martial
Introduction
In this exposé, we have briefed the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution for the United
States of America and the powers acquired by Congress thereunder to impose Law Martial upon
the States. What most people don’t realize is that they have been under Martial Law Rule for over
60 years.111
The case of Ex parte Milligan,112 is where our study of the Law-Martial begins wherein the
United States supreme court lists and explains three forms of Martial-Law. Like it or not, we have
to deal with these three forms:
1. Full Martial Law.
2. Martial Law Proper.
3. Martial Law Rule.
Full Martial Law is when a Declaration of Martial Law is issued, and military troops are put in the
streets to control a region or district with military force. The federal armed forces with the
National Guard are on every street corner enforcing military jurisdiction on every Citizen of the
Nation. This form is only supposed to be used when the Nation is at War, a declared War by
Congress, and should only be used on foreign soil unless the country is actually invaded by some
foreign power or to put down an armed rebellion too large to be dealt with by the civil
authorities or powers of our constitutional government.
The first indication of imposition of Full Martial Law (with the exception of the troops actually
in the streets wielding their military power), is the suspension of the constitutional civil judicial
power to enforce the rights of liberty with the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus. This is
clear from the American Constitutions (both State and federal) which generally provide that this
great bulwark of liberty may not be suspended except upon declaration of the legislature that the
public safety require it due to rebellion or invasion. [For example, Const. for U.S. of A., Article
1, Section 9, Clause 2.] The cause that allows suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus is the only cause for imposition of Full Martial Law.
Martial Law Proper is the law governing the internal operation of the armed forces. It is this
law that is followed to control military command of armed forces. For example, it is the law used
to enforce an “Order” of a Sergeant upon a Private. It is the law that is enforced by Courts Martial.
Martial-Law Rule is the law of necessity and emergency. This form allows a domestic use of
martial law powers, but only for as long as the necessity or emergency exist. The most dangerous
thing about this form of Martial Law is that this form of Martial Law is used during times of peace.
Called by some writers on the subject (and termed such by a few Constitutions) – the “Law
Martial,” this jurisdiction has existed since the United States Constitution was first established.
The Congress and the President of the United States have argued since the beginning on how far
the Law-Martial power can be exercised by both branches of the government. The United States
Constitution and the State Constitutions authorize the power to exist, but they do not necessarily
define its proper or legitimate use. Should the Law Martial power be abused by the Executive
and/or the Legislative Branches (when the Judicial Branch will not check the abuse of the Law
Martial powers), the people (being confused) become alarmed and begin to disobey the Statutes
authorized under the powers of the Law Martial.
Any one of the three forms (used strictly for the purpose they were structured for) would be
(according to the United States supreme Court) constitutional. It appears that it is the third form
of the Law Martial [Martial Law Rule] that could be and is used to destroy the letter and spirit of
the original United States Constitution. It is also the third form [Martial Law Rule] that can be
administered as to lead the people to believe that the Government is administering constitutional
law when in fact, the Government is administering Martial-Law Rule under the appearance of
constitutional law.
Try as the government may, the people smell a rat. The “Federal Tax Laws” is the first line of
disobedience by the people. The people for the last fifty years have in large numbers disobeyed
the tax laws (particularity the “Personal Federal Income Tax”) which is claimed by these people
to be “un-Constitutional.” Many have come forth with their claims to the un-Constitutionality of
the tax laws and have failed. Have they failed because they have not understood that the “Federal
Personal Income Tax” is within a military venue and is enforced under a Martial Law Jurisdiction?
The Government seizes their property without “Court Orders.” The Government seizes their bank
accounts without “Court Orders” and the Government seizes their wages without “Court Orders.”
The people just can’t seem to grasp the source of power that the Government is exercising. If
they read General Order No. 100 by Abraham Lincoln, they will discover the source of their
problem.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD
The following material is part of Instructions For The Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field, prepared by Francis Lieber, promulgated as General Orders No. 100 by
President Lincoln, (24 April 1863). General Orders No. 100 can be found published in the book
The Law of Armed Conflicts, Third Ed., Edited by Dietrich Schindler and Jiri Toman, wherein its
inclusion was explained as follows:
The Lieber Instructions represent the first attempt to codify the laws of war. They were
prepared during the American Civil War by Francis Lieber, then a professor of Columbia College
in New York, revised by a board of officers and promulgated by President Lincoln. Although they
were binding only on the forces of the United States, they correspond to a great extend to the
laws and customs of war existing at that time. The Lieber Instructions strongly influenced the
further codification of the laws of war and the adoption of similar regulations by other states.
They formed the origin of the project of an international convention on the laws of war presented
to the Brussels Conference in 1874 (No. 2) and stimulated the adoption of the Hague Conventions
on land warfare of 1899 and 1907 (No’s. 7 and 8). – [The Law of Armed Conflicts, p. 3].
The Law of Armed Conflicts also lists as sources of the published text in English as follows:
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by
Francis Lieber, LL.D., Originally Issued as General Orders No. 100, Adjutant General’s Office 1863,
Washington 1898, Government Printing Office; Francis Lieber, Contributions to Political Science,
Including Lectures on the Constitution of the United States and Other Papers, Miscellaneous
Writings, Vol. II, 1881, p. 245; Wilson – Tucker pp. VI-XXXVI; Friedman. pp. 158-186.
For the purpose of this exposé, we will quote only those Articles of the Lieber Instructions
(with comments) that affect us on a day to day basis.
SECTION I

Martial Law – Military jurisdiction – Military necessity – Retaliation
Art. 1. A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands, in consequence of the occupation, under the
Martial Law of the invading or occupying army, whether any proclamation declaring Martial Law, or any public
warning to the inhabitants, has been issued or not. Martial Law is the immediate and direct effect and
consequence of occupation or conquest. The presence of a hostile army proclaims its Martial Law.
NOTE: Is there a hostile army presence in every State in the Union, enforcing Martial-Law
jurisdiction on the Citizens of the several States? Has America been taken by conquest?
According to the United States Supreme Court in Texas v. White, (1868) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 721, the
court ruled the Civil War was not a war of conquest. If the civil war was not a war of conquest,
then we are under one of the forms of the Law Martial. We must be under occupation. The
above Article does not say the Nation has to be under occupation by a foreign nation’s army. In
and after the Civil War, Citizens of this Nation were under the Law-Martial and occupation of the
Union Army. The fact is, we must prove today that the several States are under occupation by a
domestic army to prove that the Citizens are under the Law Martial Jurisdiction.
Citizens see this domestic Army of Occupation every day, but don’t recognize them as the
Military Police. This domestic Army is on every street of every State in this Union. Citizens don’t
recognize this Army because the Army hides behind a Vail of secrecy, what appears to be a civilian
uniform. To unveil this Army, the people need to look up the State Statutes on the term: “Peace
Officer.” Every State in the Union has a Statute establishing “Peace Officers.” The term: “Peace
Officer” in these Statutes means: the Military Police of the State. The “Military Police of the State”
is not the State Militia.
Examine your State, County, and City Police. All of the civil police officers are statutorily
defined as a single form of “Officer,” a “Peace Officer.” Do local police units have military ranks
such as “Sergeants,” “Captains,” “Lieutenants,” and “Quartermasters?” Have you ever heard the
police refer to people as “civilians?” What National flag and/or State Flag is displayed at your local
police department? The County Sheriff Deputies in Oregon wear the yellow fringe National Flag
patch on their uniforms. Are you beginning to recognize the troops of occupation on every street
of this Union? Are you under occupation? When a local policeman enforces a curfew (as they are
across this Nation today), is the policeman enforcing the curfew as a Sheriff’s Deputy, State
Policeman, or City Policeman, or are all three enforcing the curfew as “Peace Officers” i.e. “State
Military Police?” The answer falls in the Statute or Ordinance they are enforcing. “Curfew” is
strictly under a Martial Law jurisdiction. How many other State Statutes, or County/City
Ordinances have been enacted by the State Legislators, County Commissioners, and City Councils,
under Martial Law Jurisdiction?
One more point. The “Military Police” must have a “Military Venue” to perform as the “State
Military Police.” The State Regional Areas under Metro-Government provide the Military Venue
for the Peace Officers to enforce Martial Law Jurisdiction. Now, can you understand that the
Nation is under occupation?
Art. 2. Martial Law does not cease during the hostile occupation, except by special proclamation, ordered by the
commander in chief; or by special mention in the treaty of peace concluding the war, when the occupation of a
place or territory continues beyond the conclusion of peace as one of the conditions of the same.
NOTE: There is no treaty of peace between the Union and the several States that is know of and
the end of full martial law was finally declared by withdrawal of troops in the streets, but repeal
of all forms of the law martial has never been declared.
Art. 3. Martial Law in a hostile country consists in the suspension, by the occupying military authority, of the
criminal and civil law, and of the domestic administration and government in the occupied place or territory, and
in the substitution of military rule and force for the same, as well as in the dictation of general laws, as far as
military necessity requires this suspension, substitution, or dictation.
The commander of the forces may proclaim that the administration of all civil and penal law shall continue either
wholly or in part, as in times of peace, unless otherwise ordered by the military authority.
NOTE: Under the Law-Martial, only the criminal jurisdiction of a Military Court is the recognized
law. But as Article Three says, “the civil courts can continue wholly or in part as long as the civil
jurisdiction does not violate the Military orders laid down by the Commander in Chief or one of
his Commanders.” By this means; a military venue, jurisdiction, and authority are imposed upon
the occupied populace under disguise of the ordinary civil courts and officers of the occupied
district or region, because the so-called civil authorities in an occupied district, or region, only
act at the pleasure of a military authority.
It should also be noted here that the several State Legislatures, County Boards of
Commissioners, and City Councils, are constantly legislating to please the edicts of the federal
government (the occupying force) and that their legislation, in this sense, is not an exercise of
State sovereignty, but instead, a compliance with edicts of the military force which occupies the
several States and consequently are edicts of Martial Law Rule.
Art. 4. Martial Law is simply military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and usage’s of war. Military
oppression is not Martial Law: It is the abuse of the power which that law confers. As Martial Law is executed by
military force, it is incumbent upon those who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice, honor,
and humanity – virtues adorning a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he possesses the
power of his arms against the unarmed.
NOTE: What is being said is abuse of the Martial Law power is not considered Martial Law. We
agree. It’s called TREASON. (See Article III, Sec. 3, U.S. Const.). Meanwhile (under this principle),
the Officers operating under Martial Law Rule are required to act in strict accordance with
Statutes and Regulations under which Martial Law Rule is imposed. That is why “Statutory
Tribunals” (courts) will declare the acts of “Peace Officers” statutorily defective in some cases, but
at the same time, refuse to impose constitutional limitations. Basically, when a Tribunal declares
that a “Peace Officer” failed to follow the requirements of a Statute, what that Tribunal has done
is declared that the “Peace Officer” failed to follow the Rules of War while exercising a Martial Law
power and therefore, was not justified in his acts.
Art. 5. Martial Law should be less stringent in places and countries fully occupied and fairly conquered. Much
greater severity may be exercised in places or regions where actual hostilities exist, or are expected and must be
prepared for. Its most complete sway is allowed – even in the commander’s own country – when face to face with
the enemy, because of the absolute necessities of the case, and of the paramount duty to defend the country
against invasion. To save the country is paramount to all other considerations.
NOTE: The above Article Five can also be understood to save a Martial-Law system as paramount
to all other considerations. As long as the system survives without armed hostility against it,
Martial Law is imposed in the milder form of Martial Law Rule, but the minute any armed hostility
is raised or threatened against the occupying force, full Martial Law is again imposed with troops
in the streets to enforce Martial Law authority. Do the Los Angeles and Chicago riots ring a bell?
How about Waco and Ruby Ridge?
Art. 6. All civil and penal law shall continue to take its usual course in the enemy’s places and territories under
Martial Law, unless interrupted or stopped by order of the occupying military power; but all the functions of the
hostile government – legislative executive, or administrative – whether of a general, provincial, or local character,
cease under Martial Law, or continue only with the sanction, or, if deemed necessary, the participation of the
occupier or invader.
NOTE: Thus, it appears that the State Legislatures and local governmental units in the several
States are still operating under a Constitutional authority, when in fact, they are operating at the
pleasure of, or with the sanction of, the Commander in Chief of the occupying force. Take a look
at the legislation and court decisions in your State and you will find that more than not, the
legislation and court decisions are designed to please the edict of the federal government in
matters such as the Civil War Amendments.
Art. 7. Martial Law extends to property, and to persons, whether they are subjects of the enemy or aliens to that
government.
NOTE: All the “non-resident alien” pleaders can trash their argument. Under any of the three
forms of the Law-Martial, it just doesn’t matter.
Art. 8. Consuls, among American and European nations, are not diplomatic agents. Nevertheless, their offices and
persons will be subjected to Martial Law in cases of urgent necessity only: their property and business are not
exempted. Any delinquency they commit against the established military rule may be punished as in the case of
any other inhabitant, and such punishment furnishes no reasonable ground for international complaint.
NOTE: All the “Ambassadors of God” pleaders just got trashed by Article Eight.
Art. 9. The functions of Ambassadors, Ministers, or other diplomatic agents accredited by neutral powers to the
hostile government, cease, so far as regards the displaced government; but the conquering or occupying power
usually recognizes them as temporarily accredited to itself.
Art. 10. Martial Law affects chiefly the police and collection of public revenue and taxes, whether imposed by the
expelled government or by the invader, and refers mainly to the support and efficiency of the army, its safety, and
the safety of its operations.
NOTE: As we have said, the Federal Personal Income Tax is collected under a Military Venue
within a Martial-Law jurisdiction. Federal Reserve Notes are Military Scrip circulated within a
Military Venue. The problem is the people don’t understand how the entire United States is
covered by a Military Venue. The first Military Venue covering the entire United States was
brought into existence through the Social Security Act. Under the Social Security Act, there was
brought into existence Ten Federal Regional Areas. These ten federal regional areas are the same
as a military base. It is not unconstitutional to circulate “military scrip” on a military base as the
base is considered to be a military venue. “Military scrip” cannot circulate in the civil jurisdiction
of the several States. To get around this Constitutional bar, the Congress (via the Social Security
Act), created Ten Military Venues, called “Federal Regional Areas.” The problem the Congress
realized was, while Congress could restructure the Government Agencies into these Federal
Regional Areas, the people could not be identified to be within this Military Venue by their own
consent. The solution was to create another Military Venue which would trick the people to
voluntarily accept recognition that they are within a Military Venue. Congress solved this problem
by creating the ZIP CODE.
The “zip code” divides the United States into Ten Military Venues called “National Areas.”
When a Citizen receives mail from an agency of the federal government (such as the I.R.S.), in the
return address of the federal agency is the district within the regional area the letter is sent from,
and on the address of the “Citizen” it was sent to is the national area [ZIP] in which he received
the correspondence from the I.R.S.. In other words, the correspondence was sent from one of the
federal regional areas [military venue] to one of the National Areas [another military venue].
“Taxing Districts” are established within one of the Federal Regional Areas, which places the
collection of taxes under a martial law jurisdiction.
Military commanders can set up “taxing districts” in an occupied region. In the United States,
the President (who is the Commander in Chief of the Military) has been authorized to set up
Internal Revenue Taxing Districts, ever since the Civil War. [see 26 U.S.C. § 7621].
Art. 11. The law of war does not only disclaim all cruelty and bad faith concerning engagements concluded with
the enemy during the war, but also the breaking of stipulations solemnly contracted by the belligerents in time
of peace, and avowedly intended to remain in force in case of war between the contracting powers.
It disclaims all extortion’s and other transactions for individual gain; all acts of private revenge, or connivance
at such acts.
Offenses to the contrary shall be severely punished, and especially so if committed by officers.
NOTE: Here is the basis for Title 42 suits (Title 42, United States Code), and the reason why 99%
of Title 42 suits fail. The Title 42 guru’s never get the point. They are trying to sue what they call
“Executive Officers” (assuming these Officers are in the civil jurisdiction of a State or the civil
jurisdiction of the United States [who, in reality, are "Military Officers" (Peace Officers) protected
from liability for Constitutional violations as they are not bound to the Articles of the
Constitutions (State or Federal) but rather, are bound to the Rules of War]). As an example,
President Clinton says he can’t be forced to court by a woman who is suing him as he is protected
in his capacity as Commander in Chief. Of course, the Articles of the Federal Constitution or the
Articles of the State Constitutions, (and their Bill of Rights) do not apply to Officers within a
Military Venue. These Officers (appearing as “Executive Officers” of the States or Federal
Government) are “Peace Officers” and can only be charged if they violate Article 6 of these Orders,
(or any other Articles under this Order regulating their duties). Under Military Rules, Title 42
suitors have no Constitutional charges to bring against a Military Officer under the Rules of
Occupation.
Art. 13. Military jurisdiction is of two kinds: First, that which is conferred and defined by statute; second, that
which is derived from the common law of war. Military offenses under the statute law must be tried in the manner
therein directed; but military offenses which do not come within the statute must be tried and punished under
the common law of war. The character of the courts which exercise these jurisdictions depends upon the local laws
of each particular country.
In the armies of the United States, the first is exercised by courts-martial, while cases which do not come within
the “Rules and Articles of War,” or the jurisdiction conferred by statute on courts martial, are tried by military
commissions.
NOTE: As you can see, some regulations are by Acts of Congress and some regulations are the
acts of the Commander in Chief (or one of his Commanders). The most interesting part of this
Article is the reference to the “common law of war.” Is this the “federal common law” the federal
courts are referring to?
Art. 15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies, and of other persons
whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of every
armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it
allows of all destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of traffic, travel, or communication,
and of all withholding of sustenance or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an
enemy’s country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the army, and of such deception as does not
involve the breaking of good faith either positively pledged, regarding agreements entered into during the war,
or supposed by the modern law of war to exist. Men who take up arms against one another in public, war do not
cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God.

NOTE: Article 15 sounds like the creed of the I.R.S.. Under this Article, would the I.R.S. be
exercising “Federal Common Law?”
Art. 16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty – that is, the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering
or for revenge, nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does not admit
of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims
acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to
peace unnecessarily difficult.
NOTE: GRANT, Sherman, and bloody Buttler must have missed reading Article 16.
This Article admits that it is perfectly fine to deceive the occupied populace into believing
they are governed by their own civil government, while in reality, they are being governed behind
the scenes by a military force. Such deception provides the greatest opportunity for military
occupation without hostility (under the pretense that no occupation or hostility exists). Simply
put, if you can control peoples minds, you don’t have to control their bodies. One who doesn’t
believe he lost his liberty will never break out in open hostility to restore it. Such deception
provides the maximum amount of control of the occupied region with the minimum expenditure
of resources, and is geared to avoid “any act of hostility which makes the return to peace (or the
appearance of peace) unnecessarily difficult.”
Art. 17. War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so
that it leads to the speedier subjection of the enemy.
NOTE: Is Article 17 justification for the depression of 1929? Justification for leading people to
believe they cannot work or survive without being a member of Social Security? Justification for
leading the people to believe that they cannot function without permission of government
officials at every turn? Justification for depriving any aspect of Life, Liberty, or Property (pursuit
of happiness), without the due process of law required by constitutional limitations, both State
and federal?
Art. 18. When a commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants, in order to lessen the number of those
who consume his stock of provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme measure, to drive them back, so as to hasten
on the surrender.
NOTE: Is this authority to regulate the farmers to bring about their surrender?
Art. 22. Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last centuries, so has likewise steadily advanced,
especially in war on land, the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile country and the
hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The principle has been more and more acknowledged that the
unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.
NOTE: Article 22 must have been written for the cowards who live in fear of the occupiers and
the people.
Art. 26. Commanding generals may cause the magistrates and civil officers of the hostile country to take the oath
of temporary allegiance or an oath of fidelity to their own victorious government or rulers, and they may expel
everyone who declines to do so. But whether they do so or not, the people and their civil officers owe strict
obedience to them as long as they hold sway over the district or country, at the peril of their lives.
NOTE: Article 26 is a mouth full. The “Order” that the State Officials is take an Oath to uphold the
Fourteenth Amendment, or be expelled from office, comes to mind. Isn’t strict obedience of the
State Officials what the United States Supreme Court demands today? Today, we don’t have State
Officials with the guts to stand up to the federal power, but there was a man in the 1800’s who
did stand up: Toombs, Robert Augustus (1810-1885), served in the United States Congress before
the Civil War and then became Confederate Secretary of State. Toombs refused to swear
allegiance to the government of the United States after the war and lost his citizenship. There
are still a few men today who place “Honor” above personal safety as Mr. Toombs did.
To whom, or to what have the Officials in your State sworn allegiance to in order to enter
office? Your first clue should come from the fact that they executed a voter registration card,
(regulated under authority of the United States) to enter into a (so-called) State Office.
SECTION II
Public and private property of the enemy – Protection of persons, and especially of women,
of religion, the arts and sciences – Punishment of crimes against the inhabitants of hostile
countries.
Art. 31. A victorious army appropriates all public money, seizes all public movable property until further direction
by its government, and sequesters for its own benefit or of that of its government all the revenues of real property
belonging to the hostile government or nation. The title to such real property remains in abeyance during military
occupation, and until the conquest is made complete.
NOTE: All movable property, real property, public money. Sounds like the I.R.S. confiscating all
the Citizens’ property for their master, the Congress of the United States.
Art. 34. As a general rule, the property belonging to churches, to hospitals, or other establishments of an
exclusively charitable character, to establishments of education, or foundations for the promotion of knowledge,
whether public schools, universities, academies of learning or observatories, museums of the fine arts, or of a
scientific character such property is not to be considered public property in the sense of paragraph 31; but it may
be taxed or used when the public service may require it.
NOTE: Look at the Churches, Schools, etc, of today. If they don’t preach or teach government
doctrine, are they not harassed and face confiscation of their property? And are they not put up
to the public as less than true Americans?
Art. 37. The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries occupied by them, religion and morality;
strictly private property; the persons of the inhabitants, especially those of women: and the sacredness of
domestic relations. Offenses to the contrary shall be rigorously punished.
This rule does not interfere with the right of the victorious invader to tax the people or their property, to levy
forced loans, to billet soldiers, or to appropriate property, especially houses, lands, boats or ships, and churches,
for temporary and military uses.
NOTE: The FBI sure didn’t read this article when they killed men, women, and children at Waco
and Ruby Ridge.
Notice that a part of the martial law is to levy taxes (for which taxing districts may be set up),
and to levy forced loans (for which instruments of debt may be issued and circulated).
The President has been setting up taxing districts called “internal revenue districts” starting
with the Civil War and continuing to date (26 U.S.C. § 7621). The establishment of revenue
districts by the president (presumably as commander-in-chief) was initially enacted to administer
the first “income taxes” in the United States, to provide revenue to execute the Civil War. The
“Act” to provide the increased revenue from imports to pay interest on the public debt, and for
other purposes, was approved August 5, 1861, Ch. 45, §§ 49, 50, 51, 12 Stat. 292, 309-310.
Paper money was also issued as a war measure in the Civil War to force loans upon the
American populace through legal tender laws. Those forced loans continue to be imposed under
the Federal Reserve Act and the legal tender statutes requiring their acceptance. The Fourteenth
Amendment in the Fourth Section further protects the inviolability of these forced loans and the
Federal Reserves Notes by declaring that the public debt incurred by the Civil War (or by law) may
not be questioned.
Art. 39. The salaries of civil officers of the hostile government who remain in the invaded territory, and continue
the work of their office, and can continue it according to the circumstances arising out of the war such as judges,
administrative or police officers, officers of city or communal governments – are paid from the public revenue of
the invaded territory, until the military government has reason wholly or partially to discontinue it. Salaries or
incomes connected with purely honorary titles are always stopped.
NOTE: Under occupation, the judges, police, etc., can get paid for committing treason by
adhering to the occupying force and imposing martial law measures.
Art. 42. Slavery, complicating and confounding the ideas of property (that is of a thing), and of personality (that
is of humanity), exists according to municipal or local law only. The law of nature and nations has never
acknowledged it. The digest of the Roman law enacts the early dictum of the pagan jurist, that “so far as the law
of nature is concerned, all men are equal.” Fugitives escaping from a country in which they were slaves, villains,
or serfs, into another country, have, for centuries past, been held free and acknowledged free by judicial decisions
of European countries, even though the municipal law of the country in which the slave had taken refuge
acknowledged slavery within its own dominions.
Art. 43. Therefore, in a war between the United States and a belligerent which admits of slavery, if a person held
in bondage by that belligerent be captured by or come as a fugitive under the protection of the military forces
of the United States, such person is immediately entitled to the rights and privileges of a freeman. To return such
person into slavery would amount to enslaving a free person, and neither the United States nor any officer under
their authority can enslave any human being. Moreover, a person so made free by the law of war is under the
shield of the law of nations, and the former owner or State can have, by the law of postliminy, no belligerent lien
or claim of service.
NOTE: Now you know why Lincoln had to start the Civil-War. WITHOUT THE MARTIAL LAW
JURISDICTION, HE COULD NOT FREE THE SLAVES!
Articles 42 and 43, clearly serve as military grounds for Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation,
and Congress’s subsequent enactments (with the help of so-called State legislatures) of the Civil
War Amendments as additional military measures. The Civil Rights Acts enacted by Congress
under the “Power Clauses” of these martial law Amendments, are also military measures. This
explains why “the people” were never asked to ratify the Civil War Amendments. They would be
imposed by irresistible military force and their consultation was neither sought nor allowed. All
of these measures (governed by the rules of war [martial law]) remain in effect in the United
States.
Art. 44. All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all destruction of property not
commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even after taking a place by main force,
all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such
other severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense.
A soldier, officer or private, in the act of committing such violence, and disobeying a superior ordering him to
abstain from it, may be lawfully killed on the spot by such superior.
NOTE: Sounds good, but what if the commander forgets to tell the troops to abstain from rape,
killing, or maiming?
This is the kind of military rule that administrative regulation is made of. If the Officer acts
under Orders, he may act against the populace under such Orders so long as he acts in the
manner specified. The only complaint that will be heard of a person affected, is a Complaint that
the Officer did not act according to his Orders (administrative regulations), but constitutional
considerations are treated as “irrelevant” under military rule of the occupying force.
Art. 46. Neither officers nor soldiers are allowed to make use of their position or power in the hostile country for
private gain, not even for commercial transactions otherwise legitimate. Offenses to the contrary committed by
commissioned officers will be punished with cashiering or such other punishment as the nature of the offense may
require; if by soldiers, they shall be punished according to the nature of the offense.
NOTE: Congress needs to read this. Are they not considered “Officers” under martial-law
jurisdiction?
Art. 47. Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder, maiming, assaults, highway robbery, theft,
burglary, fraud, forgery, and rape, if committed by an American soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants,
are not only punishable as at home, but in all cases in which death is not inflicted, the severer punishment shall
be preferred.
NOTE: This rule confuses the occupied populace into believing they still have control of their
government under their own local law by leaving it in effect so far as the occupying force allows
it. Consequently, a populace that has been governed by martial law for decades can loose sight
of the fact that they are being governed by martial law.
SECTION III

Deserters – Prisoners of war – Hostages – Booty on the battlefield
Art. 49. A prisoner of war is a public enemy armed or attached to the hostile army for active aid, who has fallen
into the hands of the captor, either fighting or wounded, on the field or in the hospital, by individual surrender
or by capitulation.
All soldiers, of whatever species of arms; all men who belong to the rising en masse of the hostile country; all
those who are attached to the army for its efficiency and promote directly the object of the war, except such as
are hereinafter provided for; all disabled men or officers on the field or elsewhere, if captured; all enemies who
have thrown away their arms and ask for quarter, are prisoners of war, and as such exposed to the inconveniences
as well as entitled to the privileges of a prisoner of war.
Art. 50. Moreover, citizens who accompany an army for whatever purpose, such as settlers, editors, or reporters
of journals, or contractors, if captured, may be made prisoners of war, and be detained as such.
The monarch and members of the hostile reigning family, male or female, the chief, and chief officers of the
hostile government, its diplomatic agents, and all persons who are of particular and singular use and benefit to
the hostile army or its government, are, if captured on belligerent ground, and if unprovided with a safe conduct
granted by the captor’s government, prisoners of war.
NOTE: Are not the Americans in the several States being treated as prisoners of war since the Civil
War under an occupying force of the federal government? And are not “licenses” and other
privileges created by statute a letter of safe conduct to such prisoners granted by the captor’s
government?
Art. 75. Prisoners of war are subject to confinement or imprisonment such as may be deemed necessary on account
of safety, but they are to be subjected to no other intentional suffering or indignity. The confinement and mode
of treating a prisoner may be varied during his captivity according to the demands of safety.
NOTE: Sounds like statutory civil rights of prisoners defined under the Civil War Amendments and
numerous Civil Rights Acts.
SECTION V
Safe-conduct – Spies – War-traitors – Captured messengers – Abuse of the flag of truce
Art. 86. All intercourse between the territories occupied by belligerent armies, whether by traffic, by letter, by
travel, or in any other way, ceases. This is the general rule, to be observed without special proclamation.
Exceptions to this rule, whether by safe-conduct, or permission to trade on a small or large scale, or by exchanging
mails, or by travel from one territory into the other, can take place only according to agreement approved by the
government, or by the highest military authority.
Contraventions of this rule are highly punishable.
NOTE: Is this what regulation of interstate commerce has become? A regulation of commerce
under a rule of war? Is this why “licenses” to travel upon highways are purported to be required?
Why “licenses” are purported to be required to do business at all?
SECTION VIII
Armistice – Capitulation
Art. 135. An armistice is the cessation of active hostilities for a period agreed between belligerents. It must be
agreed upon in writing, and duly ratified by the highest authorities of the contending parties.
Art. 136. If an armistice be declared, without conditions, it extends no further than to require a total cessation
of hostilities along the front of both belligerents.
If conditions be agreed upon, they should be clearly expressed, and must be rigidly adhered to by both parties.
If either party violates any express condition, the armistice may be declared null and void by the other.
Art. 137. An armistice may be general, and valid for all points and lines of the belligerents, or special, that is,
referring to certain troops or certain localities only.
An armistice may be concluded for a definite time; or for an indefinite time, during which either belligerent may
resume hostilities on giving the notice agreed upon to the other.
Art. 138. The motives which induce the one or the other belligerent to conclude an armistice, whether it be
expected to be preliminary to a treaty of peace, or to prepare during the armistice for a more vigorous prosecution
of the war, does in no way affect the character of the armistice itself.
Art. 139. An armistice is binding upon the belligerents from the day of the agreed commencement; but the officers
of the armies are responsible from the day only when they receive official information of its existence.
Art. 140. Commanding officers have the right to conclude armistices binding on the district over which their
command extends, but such armistice is subject to the ratification of the superior authority, and ceases so soon
as it is made known to the enemy that the armistice is not ratified, even if a certain time for the elapsing between
giving notice of cessation and the resumption of hostilities should have been stipulated for.
Art. 141. It is incumbent upon the contracting parties of an armistice to stipulate what intercourse of persons or
traffic between the inhabitants of the territories occupied by the hostile armies shall be allowed, if any.
If nothing is stipulated the intercourse remains suspended, as during actual hostilities.
Art. 142. An armistice is not a partial or a temporary peace; it is only the suspension of military operations to the
extent agreed upon by the parties.
Art. 143. When an armistice is concluded between a fortified place and the army besieging it, it is agreed by all
the authorities on this subject that the besieger must cease all extension, perfection, or advance of his attacking
works as much so as from attacks by main force.
But as there is a difference of opinion among martial jurists, whether the besieged have the right to repair
breaches or to erect new works of defense within the place during an armistice, this point should be determined
by express agreement between the parties.
Art. 144. So soon as a capitulation is signed, the capitulator has no right to demolish, destroy, or injure the works,
arms, stores, or ammunition, in his possession, during the time which elapses between the signing and the
execution of the capitulation, unless otherwise stipulated in the same.
Art. 145. When an armistice is clearly broken by one of the parties, the other party is released from all obligation
to observe it.
Art. 146. Prisoners taken in the act of breaking an armistice must be treated as prisoners of war, the officer alone
being responsible who gives the order for such a violation of an armistice. The highest authority of the belligerent
aggrieved may demand redress for the infraction of an armistice.
Art. 147. Belligerents sometimes conclude an armistice while their plenipotentiaries are met to discuss the
conditions of a treaty of peace; but plenipotentiaries may meet without a preliminary armistice; in the latter case,
the war is carried on without any abatement.
NOTE: Read Articles 135 through 147 again. Is the BUCK ACT, /113 providing for concurrent
jurisdiction of (so-called) State officials and federal officers within the boundaries of State – an
“Armistice” providing for federal control within a State? Are regional metropolitan service districts
the result of a local Armistice between cities and/or counties and the federal government under
Article 140 to govern a specific district? Are not all the Statutes and Agreements between State
legislators and the federal government (to obtain federal funds and to administer federal
regulations) written in the form of an Armistice that allow activities within the State subject to
federal restrictions not otherwise authorized by the Constitution?
State legislators have no power to waive the sovereignty of the State (never having been
vested with that power by the people of the State). But have they capitulated to a captor in an
Armistice of Peace without telling the populace they remain under siege of a captor (the Federal
Government) save for the Armistice? And when a State says “no” to the 13th and later
Amendments, and says “no” to the income tax, and says “no” to the Federal Reserve, and says “no”
to federal Officials entering the State to impose martial law measures, will the Congress or the
President (as commander in chief) “Order” invasion of the State by federal military forces for a
breach of Armistice? Is this why Sheriffs, State Judges, City and County Boards and Commissions
and the State legislature consistently refuse to tell the “feds” to take a hike, and tell the people
that they are required do what they are told to do by the feds? Do they fear military retaliation
from the occupying central government? Do they fear personal retribution in the way of civil and
criminal charges (and imprisonment if they fail to impose the will of their captor upon the
populace within the State)? Even if they refuse to take action, they could at least tell the truth and
let the people of the State know that they remain “occupied” by an invading force imposing
martial law. Or, would this justify a “death penalty” upon them as a “war traitor” for giving
information to their government (the enemy) while inhabiting occupied belligerent territory under
Articles 90 /114 & 91, /115 (being separated from their own government)?
You need to study the full text of the Lieber codified rules of war. Therein you will find the
implementation of these rules for the government of the United States in every aspect of law and
of your life.
Conclusion
Under our form of government, every American (individually or by representation) is the high
and supreme sovereign authority. The authority of each of the three departments of government
is defined and established.
It is entirely fitting and proper to observe that in all instances between the States and the
United States, and the People, there is no such thing as the idea of a compact between the People
on one side and the Government on the other. The compact is that of the people with each other
to produce and constitute a government.
To suggest that any government can be a party to a compact with the whole people is
supposing it to have an existence before it can have a right to exist.
The only instance in which a compact can take place between the people and those who
exercise the government, is that the people shall pay while they choose to employ them.
A Constitution is the property of the Nation and more specifically of the Individual, and not
those who exercise the government. All the Constitutions of America are declared to be
established in the authority of the People.
The authority of the Constitution is grounded upon the absolute, God-given free agency of
each Individual, and this is the basis of all powers granted, reserved or withheld in the
authorization of every word, phrase, clause or paragraph of the Constitution. Any attempt by
Congress, the President or the Courts to limit, change or enlarge even the most claimed
insignificant provision is therefore ultra vires and void ab initio.
No one applying the Constitution to any situation has any business, right or duty to look in
any direction for sovereignty but toward the people. Any attempt or inclination to do so is a
violation of one’s Oath and continuing duty to uphold, maintain and support the Constitution of
the United States of America.
As the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
are found to have been brought into effect outside the mandates of Article V of the United States
Constitution, these three Amendments (as a franchise to the United States) must be forfeited as
a case of perversion./116 An Amendment to the United States Constitution is not brought into
effect through usage, by Acts of Congress, or by Opinions of Courts.
The federal Courts of the United States have found that questions of ratification of an
Amendment to the United States Constitution are “political questions” to which the Courts will
not address. According to the federal Courts, either the Congress of the United States or the
States
have the “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issues” to determine the
validity of the ratification votes cast on an Amendment.
The authority to determine the validity of the votes cast in ratification of an Amendment are
with the States and more specific, with the Convention of the States, as the U.S. Constitution at
Article V declares that it shall be the power of the legislatures of the States to ratify proposed
Amendments and to call for Constitutional Conventions. The people have declared within Article
IX of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution for the United States that those powers not delegated
to the United States are reserved to the States.
As the federal Courts and the Congress of the United States have refused to determine the
legitimacy of the ratification votes cast on the Civil War Amendments, it is proper and necessary
for the legislatures of the States to question the Amendments. It appears from case law, the
proper procedure would be for the legislatures of the several States to call for a “Constitutional
Convention” for the purpose of making an investigation into the Amendments to determine if they
were proposed and ratified in accordance to the provisions of the Constitution for the United
States of America. It appears that only the “Convention” has the authority and power to act on
questions with respect to matters of fraud, irregularity, or illegal practices in the conduct of
Congress or the Legislatures. /117
End of Exposé
1 – 7 Wall. 700, 19 L.Ed. 227
2 – 13 Stat. 760, 763, 764, 765, 767, 768, 769, 771 [1865]
3 – 13 Stat. 758 [1865]
4 – see Article I, Section 5, Constitution of the United States
5 – see Article I, Section 5, Constitution of the United States
6 – 15 Stat. 707 (1868)
7 – 15 Stat. 708 [1868]
8 – 258 U.S. 130, 42 S.Ct. 217, 66 L.Ed. 505
9 – Sup.Ct. No. 93-0170 – “Writ of Certiorari Denied” – The U.S. Supreme Court denial of Writ
of Certiorari sustains the lower court(s) rulings that reviewing an Amendment to
determine if it was adopted in accordance to the provisions of the U.S. Constitution was
a “political question” to the courts.
10 – [Ak. Dist. Ct. J90-010], [U.S. Ct. App. 9th Cir. 91-35862], [U.S. Supreme Ct. 93-0170]
11 – 307 U.S. 433 (1939)
12 – 792 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1986)

13 – Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
14 – 307 U.S. 433 (1939). Cf. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922), wherein the Court held
that a private citizen could not sue in the federal courts to secure an indirect
determination of the validity of a constitutional amendment about to be adopted.
15 – Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456, 459 (1939) (Justices Black, Roberts, Frankfurter, and
Douglas concurring). Because the four believed that the parties lacked standing to bring
the action, id., 456, 460 (Justice Frankfurter dissenting on this point, joined by the other
three Justices), the further discussion of the applicability of the political question doctrine
is, strictly speaking, dicta. Justice Stevens, then a circuit judge, also felt free to disregard
the opinion because a majority of the Court in Coleman “refuse to accept that position.”
Dyer v. Blair, 390 F.Supp. 1291, 1299-1300 (D.C.N.D.Ill. 1975) (three-judge court). See also
Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F.Supp. 1107, 1125-1126 (D.C.D. Idaho, 1981), vacated and
remanded to dismiss, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
16 – Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 447-456 (1939) (Chief Justice Hughes joined by Justices
Stone and Reed).
17 – Justices Black, Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas thought this issue was non-justiciable
too. Id., 456. Although all nine Justices joined the rest of the decision, see id., 470, 474
(Justice Butler, joined by Justice McReynolds, dissenting), one Justice did not participate
in deciding the issue of the lieutenant governor’s participation; apparently, Justice
McReynolds was the absent Member. Note, 28 Geo. L. J. 199, 200 n. 7 (19). Thus, Chief
Justice Hughes and Justices Stone, Reed, and Butler would have been the four finding the
issue justiciable.
18 – The strongest argument to the effect that constitutional amendment questions are
justiciable is Rees, “Throwing Away the Key: The Unconstitutionality of the Equal Rights
Amendment Extension,” 58 Tex. L. Rev. 875, 886-901 (1980), and his student note,
Comment, “Rescinding ratification of Proposed constitutional Amendments – A Question
for the Court,” 37 La. L. Rev. 896 (1977). Much of the scholarly argument is collected in
the ERA time extension hearings. See supra, p. 903 n. 23. The only recent judicial
precedent directly on point found justiciability on at least some questions. Dyer v. Blair,
390 F.Supp. 1291 (D.C.N.D.Ill., 1975) (three-judge court); Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp.
1107 (D.C.D.Idaho, 1981), vacated and remanded to dismiss, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
19 – In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962), the Court, in explaining the political question
doctrine and categorizing cases, observed that Coleman v. Miller “held that the questions
of how long a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution remained open to
ratification, and what effect a prior rejection had on a subsequent ratification, were
committed to congressional resolution and involved criteria of decision that necessarily
escaped the judicial grasp.” both characteristics were features that the Court in Baker,
(supra, 217), identified as elements of political questions, e.g., “a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.” Later formulations have
adhered to this way of expressing the matter. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969);
O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973). However, it
could be argued that, whatever the Court may say, what it did, particularly in Powell but
also in Baker, largely drains the political question doctrine of its force. but see Goldwater
v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (opinion of Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, Stevens, and
Chief Justice Burger) (relying heavily upon Coleman v. Miller to find an issue of treaty
termination nonjusticiable). Compare id., 1001 (Justice Powell concurring) (viewing
Coleman v. Miller as limited to its context).
20 – 439 P2d. 266, 267 [1968]
21 – 540 P2d. 936
22 – CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, House – June 13, 1967 at pages 15641-15646
23 – 7 Wall. 700, 19 L.Ed. 227
24 – Presidential Proclamation of August 20, 1866
25 – Wise v. Chandler, 108 S.W.2d 1024 (1937), cert. granted 58 S.Ct. 831, 303 U.S. 634, 82
L.Ed. 1095, cert. dismissed 59 S.Ct. 992, 307 U.S. 474, 83 L.Ed. 1407.
26 – President Proclamation No. 153 of April 2, 1866 and 14 Stat. 814
27 – 14 Stat. 428 Chap. 153
28 – 15 Stat. 73, Chap, 70
29 – FORTY-FIRST CONGRESS, Sess. I. Chap. 30
30 – FORTY-FIRST CONGRESS, Sess. II. Chap. 39
31 – 14 Stat. 428 at section 5
32 – 15 Stat. 73, Chap, 70
33 – FORTY-FIRST CONGRESS, Sess. II. Chap. 39
34 – THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS. Sess. II. Ch. 153
35 – FORTIETH CONGRESS. Sess. I. Ch.30
36 – THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS. Sess. II. Ch. 153
37 – THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS, Sess. II, Ch. 153
38 – FORTIETH CONGRESS, Sess II, Ch. 70, ss 3 [14 Stat. 73, 74]
39 – FORTY-FIRST CONGRESS, Sess. II, Ch. 39
40 – House Journal, 37th Congress, 1st Sess. Pg. 123; and Senate Journal, 37th Congress, 1st
Sess. pg. 91: “Resolved, That the present deplorable civil war has been forced upon the
country by the disunionists of the southern States now in revolt against the constitutional
government and in arms around the capital; that in this national emergency Congress,
banishing all feeling of mere passion or resentment, will recollect only its duty to the
whole country; that this war is not prosecuted upon our part in any spirit of oppression,
nor for any purpose of conquest or subjugation, nor purpose of overthrowing or
interfering with the rights or established institutions of those States, but to defend and
maintain the supremacy of the Constitution and all laws made in pursuance thereof, and
to preserve the Union, with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States
unimpaired; that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease.”
41 – 60 U.S. 405
42 – THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS, SESS. II, Ch. 153 at Section 5
43 – THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS, SESS. II, Ch. 153 at Section 5
44 – THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS, SESS. II, Ch. 153 at Section 5
45 – THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS, SESS. II, Ch. 153 at Section 5
46 – THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS, SESS. II, Ch. 153 at Section 5
47 – THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS, SESS. II, Ch. 153 at Section 6
48 – Negroes are Aliens [Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 405]
49 – 15 Stat. 76
50 – House Journal, 40th Congress, 2nd. Sess. pg. 1126
51 – “Whereas the legislatures of the States [naming them] being three fourths and more of the
several States of the Union, have ratified the fourteenth article of amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, duly proposed by two thirds of each House of the
Thirty-ninth Congress; therefore, “Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives
concurring,) That said fourteenth article is hereby declared to be a part of the Constitution
of the United States, and it shall be duly promulgated as such by the Secretary of State”
52 – 15 Stat. 708
53 – 15 Stat. 708
54 – 15 Stat. 76
55 – 307 U.S. 433 (1939)
56 – 792 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir. 1986)
57 – [Ak. Dist. Ct. J90-010], [U.S. Ct. App. 9th Cir. 91-35862], [U.S. Supreme Ct. 93-0170]
58 – “. . . shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified
by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states, or by conventions thereof, . . .”
59 – “The powers not delegated to the United States by this Constitution, nor prohibited by it
to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”
60 – 1 Litt. Ky. R. 326
61 – 10 Conn 340 (1834)
62 – 103 US 370, 26 L.Ed. 567 (1880)
63 – 176 US 581, 592-93, 20 S.Ct. 448, 44 L.Ed. 445 (1900)
64 – 112 US 94, 102, 5 S.Ct. 41, 28 L.Ed. 643 (1884)
65 – 112 US 94, 102 (1884)
66 – Ch. 42, Sect 8, 12 Stat. 287, 288
67 – Ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235
68 – 33 Tex 634, 638 (1830)
69 – 1 Stat. 82
70 – 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 264-265 (1906)
71 – 2 Bart 422
72 – 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 627
73 – Ch. 389, 30 Stat. 432
74 – 5 US (2 Cranch) 137, 174, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)
75 – 401 U.S. 815, 91 S.Ct. 1060, 28 L.Ed. 499 (1971)
76 – See – Thirteenth Amendment, Section 2, Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5, and Fifteenth
Amendment, Section 2
77 – Article I, Section 8, Clause 12, Constitution for the United States of America
78 – 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 593, 20 L.Ed 287 (1870)
79 – 110 US 421, 449, 4 S.Ct. 122, 28 L.Ed. 204 (1884)
80 – 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 177
81 – 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 178
82 – See 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 148, 149
83 – Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 20 L.Ed. 287
84 – 75 U.S. (8 Wall). 1, 9; 19 L.Ed. 361 (1868)
85 – 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 603, 19 L.Ed 513 (1870)
86 – 12 Wall 457
87 – 110 U.S. at 425
88 – 12 Wall. (U.S.) 457
89 – 12 Wall. 535
90 – Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457
91 – 12 Wall. 557
92 – 110 US 421
93 – 16 Wall. 36.
94 – 16 F. 54; 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 630 (1883)
95 – 8 Wall. 6 (1868)
96 – 102 S.Ct. 2858 (1982)
97 – 1 Cranch 137
98 – 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 633
99 – 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393, 404-412 (1857)
100 – See Article VII, Const. for U.S. of A.
101 – 103 U.S. 370, 26 L.Ed. 567 [1880]
102 – 19 How. at 419
103 – 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1889)
104 – McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787 (Cal. 1948); Rivera-Cruz v. Gray, 104 So.2d 501 (Fla.
1958).
105 – see Alabama v. Manley, 441 So.2d 864, 879 (Ala. 1983); Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713,
725 – (N.J. 1964), both quoting sections from Judge John A. Jameson, A Treatise on
Constitutional Conventions (4th ed, 1887).
106 – see also 5 Cal.Jur. 559-560, § 11; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 7, Page 30-31; 11 Am.Jur.
629, § 25 [1948].
107 – Id. at 788.
108 – Id. at 794-96.
109 – 238 So.2d 824 (Fla. 1970).
110 – Id. at 891.
111 – In Reg: U.S. Senate Report No. 93-549 dated 11/19/73 (73 CIS Serial Set S963-2 – [607
Pages]): “Since March 9, 1933; the United States has been in a state of declared National
Emergency . . . Under the powers delegated by these statutes, the President may: seize
property; organize and control the means of production; seize commodities; assign
military forces abroad; institute martial law; seize and control all transportation and
communication; regulate the operation of private enterprise; restrict travel; and in a
plethora of particular ways, control the lives of all American citizens. . . . A majority of the
people of the United States have lived all of their lives under emergency rule. For 40 years,
freedoms and governmental procedures guaranteed by the Constitution have in varying
degrees been abridged by laws brought into force by states of national emergency . . .”
112 – 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2, 18 L. Ed. 281, p. 302.
113 – 4 U.S.C.S. 105-113
114 – Art. 90. A traitor under the law of war, or a war-traitor, is a person in a place or district
under Martial Law who, unauthorized by the military commander, gives information of any
kind to the enemy, or holds intercourse with him.
115 – Art. 91. The war-traitor is always severely punished. If his offense consists in betraying to
the enemy anything concerning the condition, safety, operations, or plans of the troops
holding or occupying the place or district, his punishment is death.
116 – 34 Penn. St. 283
117 – In re Opinions of the Justices, 167 A. 176, 132 Me. 491.